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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Basic Data
1. Year of Establishment: 1962
Paid-in share capital
2. Ownership: Won million Percent
Government of Korea 19,676.5 65.6
Commercial banks 10,269.7 34.1
Others 53.8 0.3
Total 30,000.0 100.0
3. Operations (Won million): 1978 1979 1980 1981 /a
Approvals
Working capital loans 152,463 180,269 282,132 335,949
Equipment loans
Domestic currency 17,093 19,903 17,384 27,917
Foreign currency 
- 850 4,554 11,050
Total Business Loans 169,556 201,022 304,070 374,916
General populace loans /b 170,984 200,325 306,144 508,942
Total Approvals 340,540 401,347 610,214 882,942
outstanding
Working capital loans 205,429 283,654 415,286 511,646
Equipment loans
Domestic currency 32,285 37,209 36,487 47,803
Foreign currency 
- - 1,808 11,075
Total Business Loans 237,714 320,863 453,581 570,524
General populace loans lb 196,261 246,375 385,363 628,093
Total Outstanding 433,975 567,238 838,944 1,198,617
4. Earnings Record (percentages):
Net income as X of average
equity 20.6 8.8 34.9 14.8
Financial expenses as % of
average total assets 8.6 9.3 11.5 12.3
Administrative expenses as %
of average total assets 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.0
Book value as X of par 222 124 155 179
Dividend payout ratio 19 45 37 -
/a Based on preliminary and provisional figures for the year ended
December 31, 1981.
/b Including households and individuals.
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5. Financial Position (Won million): 1978 1979 1980 1981 /a
Total assets 868,792 1,177,303 1,501,084 2,019,784
Of which total loan portfolio 433,975 567,238 838,944 1,198,617
Long-term debt 345,817 402,932 477,093 637,333
Equity 11,076 37,295 46,510 53,769
Current ratio 1.20 1.13 1.11 1.11
Total debt/equity ratio 77.4 30.6 31.2 35.9
Long-term debt/equity ratio /b 24.2 6.2 6.3 7.7
Reserves and provisions as % of
loan porcfolio 1.60 1.70 2.40 2.8
6. CNB's Interest Rates and Charges (effective from
January 14, 1982): %
Foreign Currency Loans /c
ADB first loan 9.4
ADB second loan 12.1
IBRD first loan 10.25
Domestic Currency Loans
Equipment Loans
Mutual installment savings 15.7 - 16.8
Term loans:
up to 3 years 15.5 - 16.0
up to 8 years 16.5 - 17.0
over 8 years 17.5 - 18.0
Working Capital Loans
Remuneration basis 15.7 - 16.8
Other types of lending (overdraft, discount 15.5 - 16.0
on bills, etc.)
General Populace Loans
Remuneration basis 15.7 - 16.8
Other types of lending 16
Penalty charges on overdue loans 24
/a Based on preliminary and provisional figures for the year ended
December 31, 1981.
/b After excluding current maturities.
/c In line with the practice of Korean govenment-owned financial institutions
in relending foreign exchange resources borrowed from official sources
(IBRD, ADB, et al), CNB charges a uniform spread of two percentage points
above its borrowing rate.
1. THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Contribution to the Economy
1.01 During the last two decades, Korea achieved remarkable economic
growth. At the beginning of the 1960s, Korea was one of the poorest
developing countries with heavy dependence on agriculture. By the late
1970s, it had become a middle-income, semi-industrialized country. During
1960-78, GNP grew by 9% p.a.; employment doubled to 13.5 million persons;
and exports grew by 27% p.a. in real terms from $33 million, or a mere 4% of
GNP, in 1960 to over $13 billion, or 34% of GNP, in 1978. Since the early
1960s, the manufacturing sector has been the engine of economic growth.
Over the period 1960-78, the manufacturing sector grew by 18% a year in real
terms, increasing its share in GNP from 14% to 27%; and in the process of
growth the sector created approximately 2.5 million new jobs, representing
about 37% of total additional employment absorbed by the economy. Korea-s
success in economic development and industrialization is largely based on a
strategy of export promotion with emphasis on manufactured exports; the
share of manufacturing in total exports rose from 20% in 1961 to over 90% in
1979.
Structural Change in Manufacturing
1.02 The growth of the manufacturing sector was accompanied by
significant adjustments in the importance of the various component
subsectors. Heavy industry expanded noticeably, as its share of manufactur-
ing value added increased from 30% in 1963, to 55% in 1979, as shown below:
COMPOSITON OF MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED (%)
Light Heavy Total
industry industry manufacturing
1963 70.3 29.7 100.0
1973 63.6 36.4 100.0
1979 45.2 54.8 100.0
Source: Korea Development Institute, 1980.
These changes in the structure of manufacturing reflect a deliberate policy
to deepen and diversify Korea's industrial base away from primary reliance
on traditional labor-intensive light industrial products.
Recent Performance, Sector Issues and Structural Adjustments
1.03 Korea-s economy began to show definite signs of overheating in
1978. Manufacturing investment, which had been increasing at a rate of
13.3% in real terms over 1975-77, accelerated sharply by 63.4% in 1978. In
retrospect, the growth of manufacturing investment was too rapid and was
excessively focused on capital-intensive industries (such as heavy machinery
and petrochemicals) resulting in a sharp rise in capital intensity of output,
duplication of facilities (especially in heavy machinery) as well as
increased inflationary pressures in 1973/79. The manufacturing growth rate
of 9.8% in 1979 was about half that in 1978; the real GNP growth was also
reduced by half to 6.4% in 1979 mainly as a result of a decline in real
exports (by about 4%) caused by Korea's weakened competitive position of
exports owing to rising wage rates and (through 1979) exchange rate
rigidity, which was corrected only in early 1980. In 1980, a recession in
the world economy, oil price hikes, a harvest failure and political uncer-
tainty as well as social unrest following the assassination of President Park
contributed to a sharp recession with a decline in real GNP of 6.2%, in
indulstrial output of 1.2% and in fixed capital formation of 14.8%. In 1981,
preliminary estimate indicates that the real GNP grew by 6-8%; but taking 1980
and 1981 together, GNP growth was negligible.
1.04 A number of structural factors affecting the industrial sector
have contributed to the slowdown. These include: overcapacity in some
branches of heavy industry aided by subsidized credit directed by the
Government; high debt/equity ratios of large industrial firms which
increased the vulnerability of Korean industry to fluctuations of demand,
exchange rates and interest rates; the large share of energy-intensive
industries in total output; real wage increases which outstripped productivity
gains in the second half of the 1970s; and the sharp rise in Korea-s price
level, compared with major trading partners, and rigidity of the exchange
rate prior to 1980 which eroded export competitiveness. The Government has
recognized these problems and introduced a number of initial policy
adjustments during 1979-81. The Government recently outlined a number of
important policy measures and a medium-term structural adjustment program in a
Letter of Development Policy for 1982-86. This letter provided the basis for
the Bank's first Structural Adjustment Loan of $250 million which was approved
in December 1981./1 The structural adjustment program has been incorporated
in the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, covering the years 1982-86. The main
features of this program include measures to improve energy-use efficiency; a
comprehensive review of industrial incentives and protection policies with the
aim of developing policies for promoting more competitive conditions and
reducing the role of Government in directing resource allocation; development
/1 For details of the structural adjustment orogram, nlease refer to the
President's Report No. P-3156-KO, dated November 17, 1981.
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of programs for restructuring and consolidation of large industries currently
suffering from substantial excess capacity; and the strengthening of project
appraisal capacity in Government agencies and key financial insitutions for
the better evaluation of major projects.
1.05 The financial system has played a crucial role in Korea by providing
the financial support necessary to implement the Government's economic
development strategy. For instance, the operation of the export credit system
under government control has been a vital ingredient of the phenomenal export
growth which has spurred the expansion of the economy since the mid-1960s.
This system served the country well during the early years of rapid growth,
but has become increasingly inappropriate as the complexity and sophistication
of the economy increase. The substantial degree of government control and the
recourse to "subsidized/directed" lending largely through the National
Investment Fund contributed to the major problem of overinvestment in certain
segments of the heavy industries. Similar government-sponsored funding
programs have been established to finance other industrial priority areas such
as machinery industries and small and medium industries. The Government has
recognized that this system of "subsidized/directed" lending has led to
suboptimal allocation of funds and has constrained the overall efficiency of
the financial system. Accordingly, a comprehensive reform program of the
financial sector, with emphasis on liberalizing the operations of financial
intermediaries, was launched in 1980. This program related to, among others,
interest rate policy, rationalization of the National Investment Fund, future
role of commercial banks, and internationalization of Korea-s capital market.
In line with the increasing focus of the Bank's lending on sectoral policy
this reform program was reviewed in the context of two recent lending
operations to the Korea Long-Term Credit Bank (Loan 1932-KO) and the Korea
Development Bank (Loan 1933-KO). A package of specific policy measures agreed
upon during negotiations of these two projects is being satisfactorily
implemented by the Government and is expected to improve the efficiency of the
financial system. Further Bank-Government collaboration on these issues is
planned.
Development Strategy and Medium-Term Prospects
1.06 The key thrust of the Government's development strategy embodied in
the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1982-86) is to restore the growth
momentum of the economy while keeping the balance of payments manageable and
reducing the rate of inflation. The Plan forecasts average annual GNP growth
of 7.6% over 1982-86 with the manufacturing sector continuing to be a major
engine of growth. The manufacturing sector is projected to grow at an average
annual rate of 11% with manufactured exports providing the impetus and its
share of GNP is projected to increase from 30.7% in 1980 to 35.0% in 1986.
Within the manufacturing sector, the machinery and light industries, in which
the presence of small- and medium-scale producers is most prominent, are
expected to be the two fastest growing subsectors (with an annual growth rate
of 17.6% for machinery industry and 9.5% for light industry). To achieve the
targeted growth in machinery and light industry output, investment is
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projected to amount to W 6 trillion ($8.5 billion) in machinery industry
and W 5.3 trillion ($7.5 billion) in light industry, jointly accounting for
70% of projected total investment in the manufacturing sector during 1982-86.
Exports of machinery and light industrial goods are projected to reach $17.3
billion (32.6% of total exports) and $20.9 billion (39.5% of total exports),
respectively, in 1986. To achieve the projected shares in the total exports
of manufactured goods, exports of machinery will need to grow at an annual
rate of 31.5% and export of the light industrial goods at an annual rate of
16.1% during 1982-86. These projections, although ambitious, reflect the
importance attached by the Government to the development of the machinery
industry and modernization of the light industry.
1.07 Export-led manufacturing growth, which is a key element in Korea's
development strategy, requires the industry to be highly productive and
efficient in the face of increasingly stiff competition in world markets. To
maintain external competitiveness, a system of floating exchange rates and a
policy of wage restraint will continue to be pursued. Also, the incentive
system is planned to be redesigned in a more neutral way, i.e., incentives
will be given to economically viable investment activities in general (rather
than limited to specified industries) with priority being given to
investments contributing to technology and manpower development, efficiency in
energy use, and development of small and medium enterprises. The Government
is now moving to give greater autonomy to financial institutions in their
management and credit allocation.
2. THE SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE (SSE) SECTOR
2.01 Definition. The Small and Medium Industry (SMI) sector is defined
in a number of laws and government decrees in terms of either total assets or
employment size as follows:
Total assets Number of
(W million) employees
Mining, Manufacturing,
transportation Up to 500 Up to 300/a
Construction Up to 500 Up to 50
Commerce and services Up to 50 Up to 20
/a For some specific industrial activities, the
Government in 1979 has enlarged the definition
to include manufacturing enterprises with up to
500 employees.
The purpose of the definition is mainly to differentiate between the clientele
of the various government-owned financial institutions. The following
analysis defines enterprises with less than 100 workers as small, enterprises
with 100 to 299 workers as medium, and enterprises with over 300 workers as
large. CNB caters to small-scale enterprises (SSE) employing less than 100
workers in accordance with the Enforcement Decree of CNB Act.
Structure and Role of Small-Scale Manufacturing
2.02 Industrial Structure. The SSE sector has played a prominent role in
the process of industrialization in Korea. In the 1960s, SSEs dominated the
light manufacturing sector, particularly activities involving simple assembly,
mixing or finishing. Improved infrastructure and transport facilities and
greater concentration of population in major cities later permitted large
enterprises to emerge and small manufacturers to expand operations by taking
advantage of scale economies; also, the widening of markets through
international trade accelerated this trend. The emergence of new and large
scale producers of light manufactures and the growth of SSEs into medium or
large units have combined to reduce the relative importance of SSEs in light
industies. At the same time, a large number of SSEs entered into the
manufacturing of plastic products and the machinery and metal working
subsectors. The table below summarizes the structure of the SSE sector in
1979.
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Table 2.1: STRUCTURE OF THE SSE SECTOR, 1979
Gross Value
Enterprises Employees output added
(Number) (000) (W billion) (W billion)
All Manufactturing 31,804 2,117 26,690 9,208
Small scale (SSE) 28,143 580 4,219 1,668
Medium scale (MSE) 2,552 433 4,342 1,576
Large scale (LSE) 1,109 1,104 18,129 5,964
Share of SSEs and SMIs/a -----------------------()------------------------
SSEs SMIs SSEs SMIs SSEs SMIs SSEs SMIs
A. Light Industry 89.5 97.1 30.0 53.1 18.7 38.5 19.3 37.7
Food and tobacco 93.7 97.9 36.6 53.8 15.7 33.9 12.9 25.4
Textile and leather 33.9 95.7 23.8 48.6 15.6 35.5 18.2 38.8
Wood Products 96.6 98.7 38.2 48.7 26.1 35.6 38.1 52.3
Paper Products 93.2 98.0 46.7 68.5 32.8 56.4 32.1 54.1
Nonmetallic minerals 91.7 97.7 35.6 62.4 21.1 45.0 20.8 43.4
Others 83.7 96.6 31.1 63.5 28.8 63.0 30.4 62.5
B. Heavy Industry 86.4 95.4 24.1 41.3 13.4 26.9 16.9 32.7
Chemical 87.4 95.7 24.5 41.2 12.7 27.9 17.1 35.8
Basic metals 83.8 94.6 22.2 38.9 10.5 20.4 10.1 20.1
Machinery 86.3 95.3 24.2 41.6 15.2 28.3 19.0 34.6
C. All Manufacturing 88.5 96.5 27.4 47.9 15.8 32.1 18.1 35.2
/a Including SSEs.
Source: EPB Reports on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, 1979.
SSEs are still prominent in wood products (particularly sawmills), paper
products (especially paper board boxes and containers, printing and
publishing) and textiles (certain segments of textile products); and the
importance of SSEs in the machinery and metal working subsectors has grown
steadily, responding in part to the backward linkages to the development of
heavy machinery industry.
2.03 The Role of SSEs. SSEs in the Korean manufacturing sector consist
of over 28,000 firms which account for nearly 89% of all manufacturing
establishments, about 27% of manufacturing employment and over 15% of value
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added and output. Exports (direct and indirect) by the SMI sector represented
over 35% of total manufactured exports in 1979-80.
2.04 As noted earlier, the Korean Industry is in a state of transition
from labor-intensive manufacturing towards products requiring higher levels of
technology and labor skills. The shift in industrial development strategy, in
retrospect, has been pursued too abruptly and has led to a lopsided
distribution of limited resources in favor of large enterprises in the heavy
and chemical industies, at the expense of a broad spectrum of small- and
medium-scale industries which lacked the funds necessary to improve their cost
competitiveness and upgrade quality, skill and technology levels. With
underinvestment, the level of productivity and technology in the SMI sector
has remained stagnant in the face of a shortage of skilled labor, high rates
of labor turnover, and rising labor cost. All these factors have resulted
in the erosion of SMI firms domestic as well as international competitive-
ness.
2.05 According to a preliminary "Long-Term Development Plan and
Promotion Policy for Small and Medium Industry in Korea (1982-1991)",/l the
shnare of SMIs in the total manufacturing exports will gradually rise from
about 35% in 1980 to about 38% in 1986, largely reflecting a projected
substantial increase in exports of machinery and light industrial products.
To achieve the projected share in the total exports of manufactured goods,
exports by SMIs will need to grow more than three-fold during 1982-1986.
These are rather ambitious targets. Nevertheless, it is clear that the SMI
sector as a whole will continue (and need) to play an important role in the
Korean economy which is largely dependent on the steady growth of exports to
achieve sustained economic growth. Therefore, it is imperative for the SMI
sector to raise its productivity and improve the quality and competitiveness
of its products. This will require not only additional capital investment
but also, equally as important, technical assistance to SMIs for improvement
of their efficiency.
2.06 Regional Distribution. The geographical distribution of SSEs is not
substantially different from that of the overall manufacturing sector. The
following table shows that the regional distribution of employment by the
manufacturing sector as a whole and SSEs is skewed in favor of Seoul and
Busan.
/1 This plan was prepared jointly by the Small and Medium Industry
Promotion Corporation (SMIPC) and the Korea Industrial Development
Institute (KID) based on a study carried out by KID during
January-August 1981. The suggested plan is being reviewed by the
klovernTnent.
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Table 2.2: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY AND SSEs
(x)
1977 1979
Employment Value added Employment Value added
All All All All
industry SSEs industry SSEs industry SSEs industry SSEs
Seoul 28.0 30.3 25.0 30.8 23.6 27.3 21.1 27.5
Busan 18.2 12.4 12.5 13.3 16.6 12.4 12.9 14.2
Other regions 53.8 57.3 62.5 55.9 59.8 60.3 66.0 58.3
10)0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: EPB Reports on Mining and Manufacturing Survey, 1977 and 1979.
While Seoul and Busan remain the largest industrial centers, considerable
improvements have taken place between 1977 and 1979 in the redistribution of
industrial employment outside these areas. This may be the first sign that
government policies aimed at a better distribution of employment are having an
impact. The efforts being made to reduce congestion in Seoul and Busan
include severe restrictions on industrial expansion in these two clites, a
program of financial assistance for the relocation of industries, the
promotion of new industrial estates such as the Pohang, Ulsan and Yeosu
complexes and the Saemaeul Movement, initiated in 1971, for creating off-farm
employment in rural areas.
2.07 Financial Structure. A recent survey of the SMI sector done by
SMIB indicates that the total debt/equity ratio of SSEs was still low reaching
only 0.4:1 for enterprises with less than 9 workers and rising gradually to
2.3:1 for enterprises with 50-99 workers in 1979. Their debt structure,
however, was heavily skewed towards short-term indebtedness mainly from
unorganized sources, accounting for about 55% of total assets as against the
15% share of long-term debt in total resources. While the overall financial
structure of SSEs is favorably compared with that of the larger end of SMIl, a
more balanced financial structure of SSEs would require a considerable
increase in the share of long-term loans from the present 15% of total
resources to, say, about 30%.
Government Policies in Support of SSEs
2.08 Legal and Institutional Framework. Over the years, the Government
has established the legal and institutional tools required to enforce its
policy objectives in the SMI sector. The legal instruments include the SMI
Cooperative Act and the SMI Business Coordination Act of 1961, the SMI Basic
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Act of 1966, the SMI Affiliation Law /1 of 1975 and the SMI Promotion Law of
1978 whose main objective was the establishment of the SMI Promotion
Corporation (SMIPC). The institutional framework has also expanded rapidly
with the establishment in the early sixties of the Small and Medium Industry
Bank (SMIB) and the Citizens National Bank (CNB). In 1962, the Korea
Federation of Small Business (KFSB) was established to operate as the apex of
a network of provincial and national cooperatives. KFSB has since remained
very active as a representative of SMI interests in government circles. It
also provides a wide range of technical assistance, marketing and procurement
services to its members. The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) which also
provides technical assistance to SMIs in addition to its normal financial
services was established as an independent institution in 1976. As the
institutional infrastructure supporting SMIs grew in size and complexity, the
Government realized that the SMI Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry (MCI) could not singlehandedly coordinate the activities of the
various bodies involved. To this end, the SMI Promotion Law of 1978 provided
for the creation of SMIPC which the Government expected ultimately to develop
into a powerful national agency in charge of implementing policies for the
development of the SMI sector.
2.09 Current Policy Objectives. SMI sector policies embodied in the
Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-86) were formulated
in the context of the broader objective of improving industrial efficiency.
Enhancement of efficiency of SMIs is one of the key thrusts of the industrial
policy for the Plan period. In order to help SMIs improve their effeciency,
emphasis is placed on: (a) expansion and strengthening of technical and
managerial extension services to SMIs and an increase of the overseas training
opportunities for managers of SMIs; (b) promotion of specialization and
vertical integration of small-scale component producers with large industries;
(c) encouragement for selected financial institutions to provide venture
capital in support of technology intensive small firms; and (d) expansion of
financial assistance to SMIs for modernization of their facilities.
Technical Assistance to SMIs
2.10 The institutional framework for technical assistance to SMIs
comprises the following:
/1 Governing relationships and subcontracting arrangements between large
industry and SMIs.
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Area of service
Institution Managerial Technical
1. Government or Government-Controlled Technical Institutions
Small and Medium Industry Promotion Corp. (SMIPC) X X
Industrial Advancement Administration (IAA) X
National Industrial Research Institute (NIRI) X
Korea Production Technology Corporation (KOPTEC) X
2. Cooperative-Type Institutions
Korea Federation of Small Business (KFSB) X X
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) X
3. Government Controlled Financial Institutions
Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) X X
Small and Medium Industry Bank (SMIB) X X
Citizens National Bank (CNB) X X
The total number of registered extension agents in the nine institutions
listed above was 515 in August 1981 and this appears to be small relative to
the needs of the SMI sector. These extension agents, however, are supple-
mented by about 630 registered technical "specialists," most of them college
professors and public accountants hired by the SMIPC on a short-term basis as
consultants.
2.11 Most critical bottlenecks for efficient delivery of extension
services, addressed in the Government-s "Plan for Improving Extension Services
to SMIs" which was formulated in December 1980, were: (a) inadequate number of
qualified extension service officers (as against a potential clientele of
about 30,000 enterprises, Korea had only 877 "registered" extension officers
in 1980 and most of them were college professors who lack actual business
experience); (b) lack of SMIPC's capability in terms of qualified personnel
(SMIPC had only 32 professional extension officers in 1980); (c) inadequate
training facilities for extension service officers and managers of SMIs; and
(d) absence of coordination among 61 institutions, agencies, federations, and
cooperatives engaging in extension services (as a result, fragmentation and
duplication of efforts were inevitable). The Government initiated various
measures to tackle the above bottlenecks. The most important was the creation
of a "Coordinating Committee for Extension Services to SMIs" in January 1981.
The Committee is chaired by the Assistant Minister of the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry (MCI) and consists of 20 representatives from various government
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2.12 In February 1981, the Committee adopted and promulgated new guide-
lines laying down the procedures of applications for extension services.
However, the problems stated in para. 2.11 particularly the problem of inade-
quate coordination among agencies, were not satisfactorily resolved because
the new procedural guidelines were found ineffective. In view of these pro-
blems and, at the same time, in fulfillment of its undertaking under the
fourth Bank loan to SMIB, the Government carried out a review of extension
services system during November/December 1981 and, in January 1982, initiated
action to rationalize the delivery of extension services. The action taken
by the Government involves the reduction in number of extension services
agencies to five (including CNB) and the creation of a working group composed
of responsible managers of these agencies for better coordination. The Bank
will work closely with the Government in continuing improvement of extension
services to SMIs in the context of this and future Bank projects. During
negotiations, Korean representatives clarified that CNB under the new arrange-
ment was expected to provide extension assistance to its SSI clients who have
no access to the services of other agencies (including SMIPC and KOPTEC).
Financing the SSE Sector
2.13 The effectiveness of the Government's strategy for allocating funds
to SSEs was made possible by (a) the establishment in the early sixties of
specialized government-owned financial institutions in support of the SMI
sector; (b) the creation of a guarantee scheme which mitigated the financial
risk involved in SSE lending, and (c) the requirement that non-specialized
financial institutions earmark a specific share of their total lending for
SMIs.
2.14 Institutional Framework. The existence of financial institutions
serving specific sectors of the economy (agriculture, housing, exports, large
industries and small industries) is characteristic of the highly fragmented
structure of the Korean financial system. The Small and Medium Industry Bank
(SMIB) was established by the Government in 1961. In 1963, the Citizens
National Bank (CNB) was created to mobilize household savings and provide
financing to its depositors. CNIB's functions have gradually evolved towards
financing household and small enterprises and it is currently allowed to
finance small industries employing up to 100 persons. At the time of its
establishment, SMIB was authorized to finance enterprises with less than
100 employees. The limit was subsequently raised to 200 employees and, in
1977, to 300 employees./I Both SMIB and CNB provide working capital and
/1 SMIB is currently authorized to finance entrepreneurs with up to 500
employees in specific activities defined in Small and Medium Industry
Promotion Act of 1979.
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equipment loans. Because the scope of their operations is limited to the SMI
sector, they accounted jointly for a substantial share (38%) of all lending to
the SMI sector and as much as 75% of all SMI equipment loans outstanding as of
May 31, 1981.
2.15 The specialized institutional framework for financing SMIs was
complemented in 1967 by a credit guarantee scheme administered by SMIB. In
1976, the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) was spun off as an autonomous
institution serving the needs of both large and small enterprises. KCGF,
however, has been required to extend at least 40% (by amount) of its
guarantees to the SMI sector.
2.16 The Korean financial svstem also comprises a number of nonspecial-
ized institutions which serve the needs of industry irrespective of size.
These institutions operate alongside the two government-owned specialized
banks (CNB and SMIB) in servicing the SMI sector. Commercial banks,
short-term finance companies, foreign commercial bank branches, leasing
companies and the Korea Long-Term Credit Bank (KLB) all provide varying
degrees of financial support to the SMI sector. In practice, only the
commercial banks (nationwide and regional) have substantial lending operations
to the SMI sector because of their large resource base. With 62% of all SMI
loans outstanding as of May 31, 1981, the aggregate SMI loan portfolio of
commercial banks was nearly twice as large as that of SMIB and CNB together.
2.17 There is substantial complementarity in the types of financial
assistance provided to the SMI sector by the commercial banks and the two
specialized banks (CNB and SMIB). The commercial banks provide mainly
short-term working capital loans: at end-May 1981, equipment loans accounted
for only about 6% of their SMI loan portfolio. SMIT and, to a lesser extent,
CNB are more heavily geared towards equipment financing with such loans
accounting respectively for 31% and 8% of their portfolio. However, as
indicated in para. 2.n7, term lending for acquisition of equipment by SMIs
appears inadequate relative to the needs of the sector.
2.18 Government Guidelines for SMI Financing. In Korea, the Government
strictly regulates the allocation of funds by the financial sector. Govern-
ment-owned specialized banks serving SMIs have been used as a channel for
administering, in addition to their normal operations, a number of special
lending programs funded by the Government to support priority activities
designated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) /1. The target
group of potential borrowers as well as the maximum amounts, duration and
terms of the loans are determined by the Ministries of Finance and Industry.
As for the allocation of funds by commercial banks, controls are exercised
/1 For example, specialized machinery industries, Saemaul projects and
subcontractors.
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in the form of (i) general guidelines identifying preferred, unpreferred and
prohibited industrial activities; (ii) a mandatory requirement instated in
1976 that SMI lending account for a specific share of the banks' portfolio;/l
and (iii) the requirement that SMI borrowers in priority activities be
considered as prime borrowers and therefore eligible for a 0.5% p.a. rebate
on the standard interest rate of commercial loans.
2.19 Most of the new guidelines have had significant impact on the flow
of institutional finance to the SMI sector. While aggregate fund flows to SMI
are adequate, the share of long-term equipment lending remains insufficient
relative to working capital finance and the recent government measures do not
seem to address this issue adequately. Equipment lending is particularly
important in the light of the objective of promoting more technology and skill
intensive investments.
Funding of SMI Lending Programs
2.20 Two special lending programs are currently in operation to provide
financial assistance to the SMI sector. In 1981, these programs were
expected to provide an aggregate amount of W 688 billion ($997 million) /2
to the sector. The "General Loan Program for SMI" is, by far, the largest,
accounting for 75% (W 500 billion or $720 million) of total SMI lending in
1981. Funding is from SMIB's and CNB's own resources and from the resources
supplied to SMIs by commercial banks in accordance with government guidelines
for portfolio composition. The amount earmarked for equipment loans was only
W 110 billion with maturity of up to 5 years. The interest subsidy is negli-
gible under this program. The other program was part of the governmnent-
sponsored system of "subsidized lending" and provided a substantial interest
subsidy to eligible subborrowers. This program, (W 168 billion) which was in
part directly funded by the Government (the SMI Promotion Fund and the
National Investment Fund) and in part by BOK's rediscounting facilities,
accounted for 25% of total SMI lending in 1981. The whole amount was
earmarked for equipment loans; and the maximum maturity of loans under this
program is 8 years. Eligible activities include machinery industries, export
industries, SMI enterprises located in industrial estates, Saemaul factories
and cooperative projects, handicrafts and those SMIs which need financial
assistance in order to implement the recommendations made by extension
services agencies.
/1 The requirement that the SMI sector account for 30% of the annual
increase in lending by nationwide commercial banks was raised to 35% in
October 1980 and from 40% to 55% for regional commercial banks.
/2 On a disbursement basis.
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2.21 In contrast to the financing of large industry for which subsid-
ized lending /1 was estimated at about 57% of total outstanding loans to
large industry at end-1980, subsidized loans accounted for only a third of
total SMI loans./2 Government objectives aimed at reducing the magnitude and
sccpe of NIF and other subsidized lending programs to large industry should,
over time, restore greater parity in the treatment of SMI and large industry.
Financial Expenses in the gMI Sector
2.22 During 1980, interest expenses represented 6.02% (up from 4.8% in
1979) of total SMI sales and were largely responsible for a sharp decline in
return (before income tax) on sales from 2.6% in 1979 to 1.3% in 1980./3 The
average cost of borrowing by SMIs rose from 14.2% in 1979 to 20.7% in 1980 as
a result of the Government-s abrupt increase in lending rates in January
1980./4 In the absence of an increase in operating leverage, return on
SMIs total assets declined from 1.6% in 1979 to 0.3% in 1980 largely because
of sharply increased financial expenses. The vulnerability of Korean industry
to interest rate fluctuations results largely from its high indebtedness, and
also from the Korean practice of applying new interest rates to all loans,
including long-term borrowing contracted prior to a change in the interest
rate structure. This practice which is equivalent to a variable interest rate
on long-term loans, however, would allow financial institutions to achieve
some degree of term transformation. It does not appear, however, that Korean
financial institutions use short-term resources for funding their term
lending.
Interest Rate Structure
2.23 The erosion of profitability induced by the Government's abrupt
increase in lending rates in January lq80 became rapidly unbearable for Korean
indtustry. The Government acknowledged the difficulties faced by industria-
lists and scaled down lending rate levels in seven steps, in June, September
and November 1980, twice in November and once in December 1981, and January
1982 by about 8 percentage points in aggregate. Annex 1 shows Korea-s
interest rate structure following these adjustments. In January 1982,
standard lending rates for equipment loans ranged from 15.5% to 18% depending
on loan maturity and on the borrower's creditworthiness. Applicable rates for
short-term working capital loans ranged from 15.5% to 16% depending on the
borrower's creditworthiness.
/1 NIF and export credit financing.
/2 Including export credit financing in addition to the program described
above.
/3 Based on BOKs financial statements analysis.
/4 From a standard rate of 18% to 26% p.a.
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2.24 The aggregate decline in deposit rates since June 1980 has slightly
outpaced the decline in lend[ng rates, thus increasing the nominal spread
between deposit and lending rates. The Government policy of ensuring the
interest spread accruing to financial intermediaries has been complemented by
a lowering of reserves requirements./l
2.25 In addition to the above changes in Korea's interest rate structure,
the Government has started a process of reduction of the subsidy elements in
the lending programs for large industries (NIF and export credits)./2 Subsi-
dies available under lending programs aimed at SMIs have also been reduced
from about 5% in November 1980 to 1.5-2% in January 1982. Applicable rate for
working capital loan is 1.5% below the standard rate and rate for equipment
loan is 15% p.a. under the Special Loan Program. The need for maintaining
interest subsidies in the SMI sector would need to be reassessed by the
Government in the context of the financial sector reform.
2.26 Inflation. During 1980, the depreciation of the Won against the
US dollar reached 26.7%. This rapid decline in the value of the Won together
with oil price hike increased inflationary pressures. The annual rate of
increase of wholesale and consumer prices accelerated from 12% and 14% respec-
tively in 1978 to 39% and 29% in 1980. Encouraged by the result of its
economic stabilization measures, the Government is projecting wholesale price
increases of 14-17% in 1981 and 10-14% in 1982. In relation to expected
inflation in 1982, the present interest rate structure is positive in real
terms, both in the case of deposit and lending rates./3 Priority should now
be attached to improving the financial structure of Korean industry over time,
so as to lower the overall level of indebtedness and thus restore some
flexibility in the efficiency of such monetary and financial policy instru-
ments as interest rates. The role of financial sector policies and of finan-
cial intermediaries is critical in ensuring that, over time, equity financing
account for a larger share of industrial investment.
/1 Down from 20% for demand deposits and 11% for time and savings deposits
in January 1980 to 3.5% both for demand and time savings deposits in
November 1981.
/2 The interest subsidy under NIF has been reduced from 4% in January 1980
to a negligible level in January 1982 (see Annex 1). The subsidized
lending rates applicable to export credits have been increased from 9% to
12% in January 1980.
/3 In relation to the projected GNP deflator (14% for 1982 and 11% for 1983),
current lending rates are substantially positive.
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3. BANK'S ROLE IN INDUSTRIAL FINANCING IN KOREA
AND PROJECT OBJECTIVES
The Bank's Role in Industrial Financing in Korea
3.01 In the past, the thrust of the Bank's industrial lending strategy
for Korea has been to promote strong development finance companies (DFCs)
capable of acting as efficient financial intermediaries. To date the Bank has
provided about $997 million to the Korean industrial sector through the Korea
Long-Term Credit Bank (KLB), the Korea Development Bank (KDB), the Small and
Medium Industry Bank (SMIB), and the Citizens National Bank (CNB). Eight Bank
loans (totaling $410 million) to KLB and four loans (totaling $352.5 million)
to KDB have been for onlending to large-scale industry. Four Bank loans
(totaling $205 million) to SMIB have been for financial assistance to small
and medium enterprises. A Bank loan of $30 million to CNB in 1980 was to
cover the very small end of the SMI sector.
3.02 The major objectives of Bank lending through DFCs in Korea in the
past have been: (a) resource transfer to provide the foreign exchange
resources needed for industrial development; (b) support of the Government's
industrial strategy, including promotion of balanced growth through regional
development, employment generation, export orientation, technological
upgrading, and skill development; and (c) strengthening the institutional
base for efficient financial intermediation. The first two of these
objectives remain important, but the Bank's institution building role has
been largely completed in the case of KDB, KLB and SMIB which are mature
institutions though more needs to be done to strengthen the institutional
capacity of CNB. The significant maturity attained in the Korean financial
sector, partly as a result of the Bank's assistance in strengthening
institutional capabilities, coupled with the Government's willingness to
address directly industrial and financial sector issues has made it possible
for the Bank to shift its lending objectives from institution-specific issues
to broader sectoral issues.
3.03 The recent Bank loans to KDB and KLB were predicated on such a
broad-based macroeconomic approach. The two loans provided a vehicle for
discussing with the Korean Government the blueprint for a major reform of
the financial sector aimed at liberalizing the operations of financial
institutions. It is expected that the agreements will ultimately improve
the responsiveness of the financial system to the requirements of Korean
industry and will help improve investment efficiency. The Bank's dialogue
with the Government on financial sector issues, which will continue in the
context of the next Korean Financial Sector loan planned for FY84, has been
proceeding in parallel with a greater involvement in the formulation of a
development strategy for the industrial sector. Such a development stra-
tegy aims to bring about the structural adjustments necessitated by the
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changing environment in which Korean industry operates. The Bank has
discussed with the Government the broad question of industrial investment
strategy and incentives in industry in the context of the Bank's structural
adjustment loan.
3.04 Structural adjustment lending and financial sector loans provided
the vehicles for a closer involvement by the Bank in shaping Korea's financial
and industrial sector development. The strategies and policy measures adopted
by the Government in both sectors at a macroeconomic level are expected, over
time, to gradually reduce distortions in factor prices and policies at the
subsector level. At the same time, concerted action may be required in
specific subsectors facing difficulties or in areas where new products and
technologies are being developed. The Bank's macro-based lending strategy is
therefore complemented by a direct involvement in the restructuring and/or
rehabilitation of specific subsectors. The Bank is currently considering
projects for technology development and for the support of small and medium
machinery industries which would emphasize skill development in Korean
industry. Also, IFC has recently decided to invest in the Korea Technology
Assistance Corporation, a subsidiary of the Korea Advanced Institute of
Science and Technology (KAIST), whose primary objective is to commercialize
production technology developed by KAIST. The proposed loan to CNB is
designed as a subsector operation which supplements other efforts in the
industrial sector by improving the efficiency of enterprises at the very low
end of the industrial spectrum.
Project Objectives
3.05 Project Background. The Bank's original intention was to make the
next loan to CNB under the proposed financial sector loan presently planned
for FY84. However, on a number of occasions, CNB reiterated its request for
another line of credit from the Bank to be made available prior to the end
of 1982. A careful review of CNB's request, its resource position and
requirements indicated that CNB would be lacking in foreign exchange resources
from December 1982. Any substantial hiatus in its foreign exchange lending
would not only result in a disruption of its foreign exchange resource
availability but would also substantially delay CNB's institutional
development as the momentum generated by the Bank's and ADB's support in
transforming the CNB into an instituion engaging in term lending to industry
would be lost.
3.06 The first Bank loan to CNB ($30 million) became effective on
August 5, 1980. CNB has performed well under the first loan in utilizing Bank
resources to finance very small economically viable projects (para. 4.37)
and in implementing the provisions of a Development Strategy for 1980/81
agreed upon in the context of the first Bank loan with the exception of
raising long-term local currency resources. Raising long-term local
currency resources in the capital market, although possible, is found
impractical for CNB given the relatively high effective cost of such
resources. However, transformation of some of CNB's substantial
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deposit resources into long-term loans is found quite feasible given the
stable nature of its deposits and other factors discussed in para. 4.51,
provided that adequate safeguard is provided through strengthening term
lending capability at the branch level. The Bank's institution-building
efforts under the first Bank loan have primarily been focused on strengthening
one of CNB's departments, which handles foreign currency term loans. Progress
made by this department has been satisfactory and has lived up to expectation.
In a situation of term transformation, however, the coverage of
institution-building efforts needs to be broadened.
3.07 Project Objectives. The project serves a number of specific
objectives. The project is expected: (a) to augment CNB's ability to provide
long-term foreign currency resources in support of the modernization and
greater efficiency of production in the SSE sector; (b) to assist CNB to move
prudently towards term transformation of a portion of its substantial
deposits; (c) to upgrade CNB's term lending capability especially at the
branch level; and (d) to encourage CNB to diversify sources of foreign
currency resources.
4. THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
The Role of CNB in the Financial System
4.01 Overview of the Financial System. Korea has a highly specialized
financial system composed of: (a) banking institutions which along with the
(central) Bank of Korea (BOK) form the monetary system; and (b) nonbank
institutions which, unlike banking institutions, do not mobilize deposits
fromn the general public. Banking institutions comprise commercial banks
(5 nationwide and 10 regional commercial banks, 33 branches of foreign
banks) and six specialized banks, which mobilize and allocate resources to
specific segments of the economy (e.g., SMIs, housing, and agriculture).
Commercial banks dominate the financial system accounting for 40% of total
assets of the financial sector at the end of 1980. Specialized banks, inclu-
ding CNB and SMIB, accounted for 24% of total assets of the financial sector
in 1980; their operations can best be characterized as a mix of commercial
banking operations and development long-term finance. CNB is operating for
and in the household as well as SSE sector; SMIB basically for and in the SMI
sector (including SSEs). The asset size of CNB and SMIB is comparable, each
accounting for about 3% of the financial sector's total assets. In allocating
its resources to SMI sector, CNB and SMIB are allowed, by their respective
acts, to finance projects employing up to 100 persons, but SMIB alone may also
finance projects employing up to 300 employees. This overlap in the clientele
between CNB and SMIB and the mandatory requirement for the SMI portfolio
composition of all non-specialized banking institutions explained in
para. 2.18 are to improve the access of SMIs to institutional financing.
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4.02 Nonhank financial institutions comprise institutions which specia-
lize in the mobilization of specific types of savings (e.g., insurance, trust,
and short-term finance companies) and development banks specialized in allo-
cating long-term resources to particular branches of the economy. In aggre-
gate, nonbank institutions accounted for 25% of the assets of the financial
sector in 1980; development banks alone represented 14% of financial sector
assets. The Korea Development Bank (KDB) and the Korea Long-Term Credit Bank
(KLB) are, among nonbank institutions, the two major sources of long-term
finance for large industry.
4.03 Role of CNB. CNB stands out in the Korean financial system as the
largest mobilizer of deposits. At the end of 1980, its total deposits
accounted for nearly 11% of aggregate deposits of the banking system. Unlike
commercial banks and other specialized banks,/l CNB's dependence on borrowed
funds (from BOK, Government and foreign sources) has been negligible (0.1%
of its total assets at the end of 1980) and CNB has been basically dependent
on its deposit resources which accounted for 88.5% of its total assets at
the end of 1980. Because of this factor and its very low maximum local
currency loan limits in any single enterprise (para. 4.06), CNB-s lending
operations and its loan portfolio have been least affected by the
Government-s directed/subsidized lending discussed earlier. However, its
loan portfolio is still small relative to total outstanding credit to SMIs
of the financial sector (only 12%) and to its own total assets (56%) since
CNB carries an unusually large surplus liquid fund in the form of deposits
with other banks and short-term securities (para. 4.39). Moreover, its
loans were extended basically on short-term (para. 4.22). While the large
balance of surplus liquid assets reflects CNB-s remarkable achievements made
so far as a mobilizer of deposits (CNB-s deposits grew fifteen times during
1971-80), it also reflects the lack of complete freedom in utilizing its
resources (i.e., overall credit ceilings imposed on CNB by the monetary
authority) and of institutional capability to engage in long-term lending.
However, the monetary authority abolished the overall credit ceiling system
in January 1982 and decided to rely on such indirect monetary policy tools
as discount rates and reserve requirements as well as open market opera-
tions. This will permit CNB to use its large domestic currency resources
more effectively and to play a more meaningful role as an allocator of
resources. With its already large resource base, its extensive branch net-
/1 At the end of 1980, borrowed funds (mainly from BOK and foreign sources)
of commercial banks accounted for about 47% of their aggregate assets
excluding guarantees and acceptances which represented 39% of reported
aggregate total assets; and those (mainly from foreign sources, BOK and
the Government) of other specialized banks not including CNB, for 49%
of their aggregate assets excluding guarantees which represented 38.5% of
reported aggregate assets.
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work which gives it the capacity to reach and serve SSEs, the renewed
emphasis of the Government on the strengthening of SSE sector, and the new
attitude of the Government towards monetary policy tools, CNB appears
particularly well placed to make a significant contribution toward the
development of SSE sector and is committed to do so (para. 4.08).
Legal Framework
4.04 CNB was incorporated in December 1962 under the Citizens National
Bank Act and began operations in February 1963 as a consolidated body of a
number of small mutual savings companies which dealt with petty finance. The
consolidation of mutual savings companies was to set up a broad-based
financial institution which caters to the financial needs of general populace
and small businesses and attracts small household savings as part of a
national effort to mobilize domestic resources for economic development. The
CNB Act empowers CNB to conduct all activities normally carried out by
commercial banks in addition to its unique authority to operate a mutual
installment savings and remuneration scheme (MISRS)./l The Act, supplemented
by an Enforcement Decree and Articles of Incorporation, governs CNB-s
policies, operations, organization, administration and capitalization. The
Act was amended in December 1977 when CNB's authorized share capital was
increased from W 5 billion to W 30 billion, and CNB was authorized to borrow
and lend in foreign currencies. The Act was last revised in December 1981
to raise CNB's authorized capital further to W 100 billion. Like other
Government-owned specialized banks, CNB's operations, financial performance,
organization and management are subject to the close supervision of the
Ministry of Finance. As a banking institution, CNB is also further subject
to supervision by the (central) Bank of Korea. Within this broad supervisory
framework, CNB's management is independent and exercises considerable
autonomy in CNB's operations.
4.05 The Government is the major shareholder of CNB (Annex 2). As of
September 30, 1981 the Government held 65.6% of CNB's paid-in capital of
W 30 billion (15.6% over the minimum of 50% it is required to hold under the
/1 Under this scheme CNB and an individual depositor enter into a mutual
contract. The depositor undertakes to deposit a fixed sum each month
for a specified period (15 to 60 months). In return CNB agrees to make
a loan (called "remuneration") after 1/5 of the contract period is com-
pleted and deposits made as contracted. The loan and deposit amounts
are so calculated as to be equal, after inclusion of interest on both
sides, at the end of the contract period, when the deposits and the loan
are simultaneously liquidated. This scheme is designed to encourage
salaried workers to save on a regular basis.
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CNB Act)./l Five commercial banks and private investors hold the rest.
The proposed increase in the authorized capital to W 100 billion was
approved by the National Assembly in December 1981. Its paid-in share
capital is scheduled to increase by W 10 billion a year starting in 1982
(para. 4.42).
Operating Policies and Development Strategy
4.06 In 1979, CNB adopted a Policy Statement (Annex 3) to supplement
the operational guidelines of the CNB Act. Apart from establishing CNB's
maximum exposure limits in any single enterprise,/2 this statement defines
in broad terms the types of enterprises and industries to which CNB should
give priority in its lending operations. CNB has so far complied with the
provisions of its Policy Statement.
4.07 In 1980, CNB formulated, in consultation with the Bank, a Develop-
ment Strategy for 1980/81 (Annex 4) outlining priority areas of financing
and its specific developmental objectives such as promotion of small and
labor-intensive projects, improving geographic dispersal of financing
activities, raising long-term local currency resources, expanding deposit
resources and strengthening research activity with particular emphasis on
sector and market studies. CNB has made good progress in implementing the
provisions of the above strategy with the exception of raising long-term
local currency resources (para. 3.06).
4.08 Recognizing the need to play a more meaningful role as an allocator
of resources for meeting the medium- and long-term credit needs of SSEs, CNB
drew up an "Outline of Development Strategy for 1982-86" (Annex 5) /3 in
consultation with the appraisal mission. Supplementing the 1980/81
Development Strategy described in the preceding paragraph, the medium-term
strategy reflects CNB's serious intention to transform itself into an
/1 CNB's paid-in capital was increased by W 25 billion in 1979 (W 11.2 bil-
lion in cash and W 13.8 billion transferred from revaluation surplus) to
reach its authorized capital of W 30 billion.
/2 25% of CNB's own equity; but, under the Enforcement Decree, its local
currency loans and guarentees to any single enterprise are further
limited to: W 50 million for equipment loans; W 40 million for working
capital loans; and W 30 million for guarantees (W 200 million for
guarantees involving foreign exchange transactions).
/3 The planning horizon for CNB's development strategy is longer than the
usual two-year time horizon normally required by the Bank because the
real impact of CNB's development strategy and efforts (particularly
term transformation) will be felt only in the later part of the five-
year plan period.
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institution engaging in term lending. During the period 1982-86, CNB plans
to expand its term lending activity for SSEs and lengthen the maturity of
its domestic currency equipment loans through prudent term-transformation
along the lines of five-year operational/financial projections supplied to the
Bank mission (para. 4.52). In order to match its institutional capabilities
with the projected increase in term loans for SSEs, CNB plans to intensify
training of its staff during 1982-83 (para. 4.14). The CNB's Development
Strategy, which was endorsed by relevant Government officials, also signifies:
both the Government's and CNB's intention to increase CNB's paid-in capital
by W 10 billion a year from 1982 and onwards up to W 100 billion (para. 4.05);
and CNB's intention to diversify its foreign currency resources during
1984-86. The Government delegation endorsed this Strategy Statement during
negotiations. The Strategy Statement was approved by CNB's Board of Directors
on April 10, 1982.
institutional Efficiency
4.09 Management. Mr. Byoung Soon Song, the former Chairman of the
Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) was appointed President on July 30, 1980.
He is assisted by a Deputy President, Mr. Sang Chan Kim (the former
Executive Director in charge of the International Department) and five
Executive Directors, each in charge of three to four of CNB's 19 departments
(see Organizational Chart). The present top management team (Annex 6) is
effective and innovative. Since the new team assumed office, a number of
institutional reforms have been introduced to streamline CNB operations.
CNB has an experienced and well-rounded cadre of managers at the department
and branch levels. Most of them have served as managers in several
departments and branches as a result of relatively frequent rotation. CNB
also has considerable managerial depth with well-groomed and capable people
at the deputy manager level.
4.10 Organization. As of December 31, 1981, CNB had 19 departments at
the Head Office, 181 branch and subbranch offices widely scattered all over
Korea and 16 depQsit offices (see Map). In the past two years, 24 new
branch and subbranch offices and 10 new deposit offices were opened, and
some important organizational modifications at the Head Office were
introduced: (a) to separate from and upgrade three divisions (Foreign
Capital, Foreign Loan and Procurement Divisions) of the International
Department (ID) to a new Foreign Loan Department (FLD);/l (b) to expand the
/1 This development is justified for two reasons: CNB obtained a license
of "A" class (or full-fledged) foreign exchange dealership on October 2,
1981. Newly added short-term export/import financing operations and
letter of credit services in addition to existing foreign exchange deal-
ing operations would keep the management of the ID fully occupied with-
out the three divisions handling foreign currency relending business;
and, more important, CNB's foreign currency relending operations, which
started in 1979, have been expanding rapidly as its long-term foreign
currency borrowings increase. To date, CNB has obtained two loans from
ADB totalling $40 million and one loan from IBRD of $30 million.
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functions of the Research and Development Department by the formation of an
industrial research unit which is responsible for conducting operations-
oriented subsector and market surveys; (c) to upgrade the Training
Department to an Educational and Training Institute in 1981 for better
implementation of a comprehensive training program (para. 4.13); and (d) to
consolidate the former Savings Department and Credit Card Department /1
under a new Customer Development Department, and the former Loan
Administration Departments I and II under a new Customer Support Department
for the delivery of better service to its clients.
4.11 Staffing. As of August 31, 1981, CNB had a total of 8,109 staff,
of which about 22% were senior professionals. Nearly 82% of total staff
were assigned to the branches, which are the focal points of client
contacts. Since September 1979, CNB-s staff strength has increased by
1,685. Staff strength of direct relevance to CNB's term lending operations
has also increased since 1979: those staff handling foreign currency
relending (now assigned to FLD) from 23 (including professional staff of 12)
to 47 (including professional staff of 23); total staff in the Credit
Analysis Department from 34 to 73; and total staff in the Research
Department from 37 to 51. Turnover of CNB's professional staff has been low
(3-5% in 1979-81). CNB projects a growth in staffing of 7-8% p.a. during
1982-84 whlich appears reasonable in light of CNB's expanding operations.
CNB's staff is highly motivated and generally competent. However, term
lending based on project appraisal is relatively new to CNB and to most of
its professional staff.
4.12 Administrative Expense. CNB has been able to keep its
administrative expenses relatively stable while expanding its branch network
and diversifying banking and development-oriented services to the household
and SSE sectors. In relation to its average total assets, administrative
expenses were 4.1% in 1979 but dropped to 3.8% in 1980. Given the large
number of deposit accounts (nearly 6 million) and loan accounts (nearly
442,000) CNB is servicing, the level of overhead cost is not excessive.
Wages and salaries accounted for 69% of total administrative expenses in
1980. CNB estimates that over 80% of total personnel expenses were
attributed to the savings/resource mobilization activities and about 20% to
lending activities. In 1980, administrative expenses related to deposit
mobilization represented 3.8% of the average daily balance of deposits; and
administrative costs related to lending operations were only 0.8% of the
average daily balance of outstanding loans. Branch staff accounted for 97%
of wages and salaries expenditures in 1980. The level of CNB's
administrative expenses favorably compares with that of commercial banks in
Korea; and overhead relative to lending operations, with those of other
specialized banks in Korea (about 1% of average total assets).
/1 CNB is the only banking institution in Korea which issues its own credit
card (para. 4.28).
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4.13 Training. CNB-s professional staff is recruited mainly among
college graduates, who undergo on-and-off-the-job training and whose
rotational assignments are frequent so as to develop versatile, well-
rounded managers. The tradeoff, however, has been that CNB-s staff, with a
few exceptions, have not developed sufficient depth in specialized fields.
On the other hand, increasing computerization of its operations in the face
of the large influx of new recruits has necessitated CNB-s continuing
emphasis on basic awareness courses on banking in general, CNB's practices
and procedures, and human relations and management skills in order to avoid
operational work of its staff degenerating into mechanical exercises. In
1980, 1,141 staff attended 16 in-house courses (including 3 professional/
technical programs for 341 staff) in addition to orientation courses offered
for 689 new recruits; 633 staff participated in 57 courses (including 3
professional/technical programs which 193 staff attended) offered by the
Korea Training Institute of Banking; 109 staff attended other external
courses; and 44 staff went overseas for training. With a view to expanding
its own capability of providing continuous training programs in line with
the changing needs of its staff, CNB established in April 1981 its own
training institute which has the capacity to accommodate 250 trainees at any
given time. The institute has 19 professional staff, including 7 full-time
instructors, and has developed a comprehensive training program for 1982/83.
4.14 Understandably, the new training program is still focusing on
basic awareness courses. But it also includes a number of
professional/technical courses specifically designed for strengthening CNB-s
term lending capabilities based on experience gained during 1979-81. Since
1979, CNB has been building up staff expertise in foreign currency term
lending. Initially (March/April 1979), CNB invited a group of senior
officers from KDB and SMIB to train all CNB staff involved in foreign
currency term lending for two months. This training comprised one month of
lectures on project identification, appraisal, procurement and supervision,
followed by one month of case studies of projects actually financed by SMIB.
In June 1980, CNB-s own staff conducted a seminar on foreign currency term
lending for 41 officers from large branches with a view to promoting their
active participation in foreign currency lending business. In 1981, 61
staff from different branches underwent a comprehensive four-stage training
program on foreign currency term lending. This program encompassed:
(i) two weeks of classroom lecture; (ii) two weeks of on-the-job training
at the FLD; (iii) case studies through correspondence; and finally
(iv) two weeks of intensive classroom discussion. CNB plans to repeat this
program on a somewhat larger scale every year for branch staff and other
staff to be transferred to branches./l Details of CNB's training program,
/1 CNB also plans to increase the number of credit analysts certified by
Korea Training Institute of Banking from the present 51 to 100 by the
end of 1982 and further to 300 by the end of 1983 so that it may assign
at least 1 credit analyst to each of the branches. CNB is also explor-
ing all the training opportunities abroad.
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particularly those related to strengthening of CNB's term lending capa-
bilities, were reviewed further during negotiations and found to be
satisfactory. The program would be implemented with the Bank Group's
assistance including a visit by an EDI lecturer to CNB.
4.15 Term Loan Appraisal. In judging CNB-s term lending capability
and the quality of its appraisal works for domestic currency equipment
loans, it is essential to take into account the following factors:
(a) CNB's SSE clients consist of a large number of unsophisticated small
firms who, in most instances, cannot meet all the information requirements
normally required by DFCs; (b) the number of domestic currency equipment
loans handled by CNB a year, although small relative to total annual number
of loan approvals of 200,000-250,000 cases, is large in absolute terms
ranging from 4,200 to just over 5,000 cases a year and the average size of
these equipment loans has been very small (below W 5 million or $7,200);
(c) the bulk (about 75%) of domestic currency equipment loans has been made
under the MISRS (para. 4.04) which in effect gives the depositor the right
to borrow without leaving CNB with much flexibility in making lending
decisions as long as borrowers meet the collateral and the contracted
deposit requirements; (d) for the reasons stated in (b) and (c) above,
lending decisions are made in most cases (over 90% of total number of
domestic currency equipment loans approved) at the branch level; and finally
(e) CNB-s domestic currency equipment loans have been extended basically on
short-term (para. 4.22).
4.16 In light of the foregoing, term loans in domestic currency had
not, in any substantive sense, been made by CNB until July 1981 when CNB
was given the access to the BOK-managed NIF. From July 1 through October
31, 1981, CNB approved 65 loans (with maximum maturity of 8 years including
a grace period of 3 years) totalling W 2 billion under the above
facilities./l The appraisal standards used for these loans, although focusing
more on the study of the borrowers' creditworthiness, are essentially the
same, in terms of coverage, as those used for foreign currency subprojects
below the free limit but demand less rigorous analysis. However, even the
above minimum standards have been found difficult to meet by most of CNB's
branches mainly because of lack of trained manpower. Hence, staff at
the Head Office (particularly those in Credit Analysis Department and those
in the Finance Division of the Customer Support Department) often provide
substantial input to improve the quality of appraisal reports prepared by
branches. The BOK seems to be generally satisfied with the quality of CNB-s
appraisal work. As indicated in para. 4.14, CNB is already taking steps to
improve the term lending capabilities of its branches.
4.17 The standard and quality of appraisal work for foreign currency
term loans are much higher and markedly better than those for domestic
currency equipment loans, reflecting adequate steps taken by CNB's manage-
ment to ensure that its appraisals are fully satisfactory to the Bank.
/1 CNB drew down a further W 4 billion from these facilities by the end of
1981. However, it is not clear whether CNB will continue to have the
access to these facilities in 1982 and onwards.
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These steps included staffing (the FLD staff were selected from the best
available candidates within CNB), training (para. 4.14), and close super-
vision of appraisal work by senior management. This effort, together with
the continuing dialogue on each subproject subject to the Bank-s approval,
has resulted in the initial major improvements and the gradual refinement
in project appraisal. With Loan No. 1829-KO, CNB began calculating economic
rates of return for all projects above the free limit of $250,000.
Systematic project evaluation is now routine. Full appraisal reports are
prepared for subloans above the free limit and less detailed ones for those
below the free limit; the quality of these reports is satisfactory. So far
appraisal of subprojects has been centralized at the Head Office to ensure
the quality of subloans. To stimulate the active participation of branches
in foreign currency term lending activities (thereby further broadening its
clientel base) and to speed up subproject processing, CNB planned to
delegate in 1982 the authority to undertake preliminary selection of
subprojects to 61 branches whose staff underwent special training in 1981
(para. 4.14). Among these 61 branches, 21 large branches whose staff
underwent further intensive training in 1981 will be given the authority to
approve subloans up to $100,000 from 1982. This move, after comprehensive
training of branch staff in 1981, represents the first step toward
expanding CNB-s term lending capacity and disseminating more sophisticated
term lending techniques within CNB.
4.18 Term Loan Supervision. CNB-s supervision of domestic currency
loans is satisfactory and effective. Its deposit taking power provides
CNB with effective supervision tools. Virtually every CNB client borrowing
term loans maintains deposit account with CNB and also borrows working
capital loans. Thus, contacts of CNB branches with borrowers are frequent
and intensive. Accordingly, CNB is provided with a built-in monitoring
system on clients. Supervision of project implementation under domestic
currency equipment loans is done through monitoring a credit control
account to which the full loan amount is credited as soon as the loan is
committed; payments are made from that account as actual expenditures
and progress are certified usually through plant visits and checking of
documents. Plant visits and project records during disbursement stage
are well documented and kept. After the project completion, projects are
normally visited at least once a year and projects with problems are visited
more frequently, in some cases once a month. Findings of follow-up visits
of problem accounts are always recorded on follow-up cards, and are
reported to the branch managers, in some cases, to the Extension Services
Division of the Credit Analysis Department at the Head Office and, in hope-
less cases, to the Loan Management Department for legal action. As CNB's
excellent collection performance and consequent low arrears position
indicate, CNB has been exceedingly effective in supervising its loans.
4.19 CNB-s foreign currency loan portfolio, which is young and small
both in number and amount (less than $10 million for 65 subprojects as of
June 30, 1981), has so far been supervised by four staff in FLD.
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Recognizing the need to entrust routine supervision of subprojects to
branches, CNB formulated suitable guidelines on subproject supervision to be
undertaken by branches on February 17, 1981. The delegation of this
responsibility to branches and the actual transfer of related subloan
docuraents, which were orginally scheduled to take place in November 1981,
have been delayed to ensure that branches familiarize themselves with the
guidelines. Also, CNB was considering the introduction of a suitable
subproject monitoring system which would enable it to assess actual benefits
derived from subprojects and compare them with appraisal projections.
Specific measures taken by CNB in strengthening its subproject supervision
capability and progress being made in developing a subproject monitoring
system were reviewed during negotiations and found to be fully satisfactory.
CNB has been informed that, in the course of Bank-s normal supervision,
particular attention will be given to the effectiveness of the subproject
monitoring system.
4.20 Procurement and Disbursement. CNB-s procurement procedures
conform to the Government's guidelines (which emphasize competitive bidding
and the contract award to the lowest bidder and which are strictly enforced
through annual audit by the State Audit Board) and to the special require-
ments of small firms. Procurement is normally based on limited competitive
bidding procedures with at least three competitive quotations from potential
suppliers. Before inviting quotations from potential suppliers named by
the subborrower, CNB-s engineers carefully review the specifications of
machinery and equipment to ensure that specifications do not give undue
competitive advantage to specific supplier. CNB-s procedures for inviting
quotations, bidding and contract award are satisfactory. A separate
division in FLD with close coordination with CNB engineers handles procure-
ment matters. CNB-s control over disbursement for subprojects is also
satisfactory.
Overview of CNB-s Operations
4.21 As a "grass roots" savings bank for the general populace and as a
development bank catering exclusively to the SSI sector, CNB provides a
wide range of financial services to its clients. These include: a
complete package of deposit accounts services; credit card business; loans
to general populace for financing housing, hospital and educational expenses;
and provision of finance to SSEs for working capital and for acquisition of
equipment and other fixed assets through its equipment loans in local and
foreign currencies, working capital loans, overdrafts, discounting of
trade bills, foreign exchange services, and other banking services. In
addition to its financial assistance, CNB offers limited but useful extension
services to its SSI clients in coordination with SMIPC. CNB-s loan portfolio
comprised over 440,000 clients (including about 49,000 SSE clients) as of
June 30, 1981. Total outstanding loans amounted to W 996 billion ($1.4 bil-
lion) of which 49% were general populace loans, 46% working capital loans
and 5% equipment loans. Since the last appraisal of CNB in 1979, CNB-s
lending operations (Annex 7) have expanded by 52% from W 401 billion in 1979
to W 610 billion in 1980. Loan approvals were W 401 billion in the first
six months of 1981 and are expected to reach W 880 billion by the end of
1981.
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4.22 Equipment Loans. As stated in para. 4.16, term lending for fixed
asset financing is a relatively new activity for CNB. As of June 30,
1981 CNB's equipment loan portfolio stood at W 44 billion and accounted for
a mere 5% of total portfolio. However, local currency equipment loans,
which represented 86% of total equipment loan portfolio, were basically
extended on short-term largely under the MISRS; maturities of these loans,
although contractually one to five years with the weighted average maturity
(by amount) of 2.8 years, have actually been only about 1.5 years. This
phenomenon is mainly attributable to "domestic credit ceilings (or guide-
lines)" under which the Government determined CNB-s credit expansion limit
(growth rate of loans outstanding)./l Because of this system and other
factors discussed in para. 4.40, CNB tended to make domestic currency equip-
ment loans shorter than desired by borrowers with a view to benefitting as
many clients as possible. Reflecting high turnover of existing portfolio
and relatively small annual lending volume, CNB's domestic currency
equipment loan portfolio has not grown as fast as could have been expected.
In order to better meet the demand for equipment financing in the SSE
sector, CNB needs to increase substantially its domestic currency financing
while also lengthening the maturities of such loans. Under the proposed
loan, CNB and the Bank address this issue (para. 4.51).
4.23 CNB's approvals of equipment loans increased only marginally (6%)
in 1980 thanks to the sharp increase (from W 850 million in 1979 to
W 4,554 million in 1980) in foreign currency equipment loans. Domestic
currency equipment loans, however, declined both in number (from 5,021 in
1979 to 3,987 in 1980) and amount (from W 19.9 billion to W 17.4 billion)
reflecting-the severe economic recession and political uncertainty that
prevailed in 1980. In the first six months of 1981, domestic currency
equipment loans reached W 10 billion (representing 15% growth on an annual
basis), foreign currency equipment loans W 7.6 billion (237% increase on an
annual basis). Average size of domestic currency equipment loans, which
hovered around W 3.3 - W 4.4 million during 1977-80, rose to W 5.3 million in
the first half of 1981; that of foreign currency equipment loans rose from
$130,000 in 1979 and 1980 to $165,000 in the first half of 1981, reflecting
mainly the price increases of capital goods. Maturity of foreign currency
equipment loans, unlike that of domestic currency loans which is too short,
averaged about 8 years.
4.24 Working Capital Loans. Working capital loans expanded rapidly and
remained a significant component of CNBs loan portfolio. Net approvals of
working capital financing which amounted to W 78 billion or 52% of total
approvals in 1979 rose by 68% to W 132 billion, or 45% of total approvals in
1980. The rapid growth of loans for working capital in 1980 resulted mainly
from the need to finance inventory accumulation due to the sluggish
/1 This system, which had been introduced in 1973, was abolished in
January 1982.
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demand for Korean products at home and abroad. As of June 30, 1981,
outstanding working capital loans amounted to W 463 billion, or 46% of the
total portfolio.
4.25 General Populace Loans. General populace loans are extended to
salaried workers to finance the basic needs of households such as housing,
hospitalization, education and the purchase of consumer durables. Both by
number of clients and amount of loans, these loans have been the mainstay of
CNB-s lending program. As of June 30, 1981, over 385,000 clients (87% of
total borrowers) had outstanding loans amounting to W 489 billion (49% of
total portfolio). The growth of lending to general populace has continued
uninterrupted; between 1977 and 1980 loan approvals increased at an annual
average of 42.5%. The average size of these loans was W 1.3 million
($1,900). Access of low wage earners to institutional finance has been
greatly facilitated by the borrowing privileges offered under the MISRS.
Apart from the Korea Housing Bank, which is specialized in providing housing
finance, CNB has been most active in extending loans for acquisition of
low-cost houses and in meeting the financial needs of the household sector.
For this reason, CNB has been successful in mobilizing deposits from the
household sector.
4.26 Guarantee Operations. CNB issues short-term guarantees against
trading documents, payments of import duties, etc. as part of the commercial
banking services to its clients. As of June 30, 1981, outstanding guarantees
amounted to W 767 million for 51 clients; there was no long-term guarantee.
In addition, CNB has entered since 1976 a special arrangement with the Korea
Credit Guaranty Fund (KCGF) under which CNB makes loans not-fully-collaterized
up to a limit of W 20 million, beyond which KCGF-s prior approval is required.
CNBs loans covered under this special scheme amounted to W 84 billion as of
June 30, 1981.
4.27 Securities Investment Operations. A substantial portion of CNB-s
large liquid assets arising from its successful mobilization of deposits and
the restrained growth of its loan portfolio under the "domestic credit
ceiling" system was invested in short-term government and quasi-government
bonds and private sector stocks and bonds. Annual volume of these operations
has been large with high turnover, reaching W 372 billion in 1979, W 442 bil-
lion in 1980 and W 100 billion in the first half of 1981. Outstanding
balances of securities portfolio as of June 30, 1981 stood at W 270 billion,
87% of which represented government and quasi-government bonds. CNB-s holding
of common shares of 17 corporations, most of which were inherited from the
Korea Investment Corporation (defunct Government-controlled corporation
which had been specialized in capital market development), totalled W 9.9 bil-
lion (or 3.7% of CNB's total securities portfolio). Annual rate of return
on overall securities investment portfolio has been satisfactory, fluctuating
from 18.6% in 1978 to 20.3% in 1980; these rates are somewhat higher than
the average rate of return on CNB-s overall loan portfolio which was 17.3%
in 1978 and 19.5% in 1980. CNB has so far managed its securities portfolio
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reasonably well. But in a situation of increasing term transformation CNB
should give greater consideration than previously to marketability and
expected rate of return before making future securities investments. A
provision to this effect is reflected in CNB-s Development Strategy
Statement.
4.28 Credit Card Business. With a view to diversifying its financial
services and attracting additional savings, CNB started credit card business
in September 1980. CNB is the first and only bank authorized to issue its
own credit cards. In October 1981, CNB credit card holders numbered 250,000
persons and the total number of affiliated shops throughout Korea was
15,000. By the end of 1981, CNB expects to have 300,000 card holders. CNB
is exploring the possibility of linking up with a major foreign credit card.
4.29 Extension Services. The extension assistance provided by CNB had
been focused on managerial and financial matters of SSEs until 1980 when
CNB created a new managerial Guidance Division in the Credit Analysis
Department. With the creation of this Division (which has now 8 managerial
extension officers and 14 engineers), the number of beneficiaries of CNB-s
extension services increased from a mere 5 firms in 1979 to 40 firms in 1980
and to a further 62 firms in the first 10 months of 1981, and the scope of
CNBs assistance has been broadened to include production technology
assistance to 14 firms in 1981. Based on the recent study on the national
extension services (para. 2.12), the Government has designated CNB as
one of five extension service agencies in Korea. CNB is expected to provide
extension assistance to its clients who have no access to the services
of SMIPC and KOPTEC. Given the increasing importance of CNB as an extension
service agent, CNB-s plan for delivering extension services to SSEs and the
adequacy of its institutional capability to deliver the planned services
were reviewed during negotiations and found to be in line with the expected
role of CNB under the new arrangement.
4.30 Research Activities. CNB regularly compiles and analyzes data on
actual conditions of small industries in the country. So far it has com-
pleted 6 comprehensive surveys of the SSI sector, which formed part of the
Government-s National Wealth Survey, and has completed studies on 16 specific
subsectors including ceramics, metal products, textiles, chemical products,
construction, etc. The objective of these studies is to analyze the
supply/demand situations of these subsectors. Therefore, these studies can
be integrated in CNB-s appraisal work. The newly established (1981)
Industrial Research Division (staffed with four economists, two business
management specialists and one statistician) is in charge of these studies.
The capability of this new unit, however, is still being developed along
with appropriate research methodologies. The studies could have been more
operations-oriented given the increasing involvement of CNB-s branches in
term lending activity. As reflected in its Development Strategy for
1982-86, CNB will continue to strengthen its research activities, with
particular emphasis on sector and market studies. CNB-s research work
program, details of which were reviewed during negotiations, includes,
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among others, the publication of its research work which would cover an
analysis of overall status of Korean SSEs, trends and prospects of speci-
fic subsectors, and periodic surveys of subsectors in which CNB has large
exposure. The outcome of these research activities will be made available
to CNB's operational staff, including those in branches, to enhance project
evaluation capability. CNB-s performance in this area will be monitored as
part of the Bank's normal supervision effort.
Efficiency in Resource Allocation
4.31 CNB's efficiency in allocating its loanable funds can be gauged
by analyzing its performance vis-a-vis its Development Strategy for 1980/81,
which outlines priority areas of financing and its specific developmental
objectives (para. 4.07), and specific agreements reached with the Bank
under Loan No. 1829-KO in utilizing the Bank-s resources.
4.32 Sectoral Distribution. The manufacturing sector accounted for
55.1% of all equipment loans outstanding as of June 30, 1981 (Annex 8).
Within manufacturing, machinery and textiles were the two dominant
subsectors representing respectively 14.6% and 10.1% of total outstanding
equipment loans. In the first half of 1981, CNB-s commitments to the
manufacturing sector accounted for 50.1% of total commitments of equipment
loans, up from 46.3% in 1980. In the manufacturing sector, transportation
(e.g., passenger buses and trucks largely financed by local currency) and
services (e.g., hospitals, computer services, and repair shops) predominate
and accounted for 19.9% and 19.1% of total equipment loans outstanding as
of June 30, 1981. In line with the spirit of its development strategy for
1980/81 and Government policy, CNB-s financial assistance to small
machinery industries has steadily increased since 1979. The share of
machinery industries in total equipment loans outstanding rose from 10% at
end of 1979 to 14.6% as of June 30, 1981; their share in CNB-s total
equipment loan commitments reached 15.2% in the first half of 1981. In its
"Outline of Development Strategy for 1982-86," CNB has specifically stated
its intention to actively assist SSEs in the machinery subsector to the
modernization of which the Government is giving a high priority.
4.33 Geographic Distribution. In accordance with its Development
Strategy for 1980/81 and in compliance with the agreement reached with the
Bank under Loan 1829-KO, CNB has achieved reasonable success in diversifying
the geographic distribution of its operations. The share of commitments
to projects in Seoul city has gradually declined from 57% in 1978 to
43% in 1980 and further to 41% in the first half of 1981, reaching the
agreed goal of limiting to 50% the share of Seoul in its total lending.
CNB will continue to pursue the objective of diversifying its lending
outside the Seoul area under its Development Strategy for 1982-86.
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4.34 Assistance to Smaller SSEs. CNB's equipment loans have been
channelled mainly (53%) to very small firms employing 5-20 workers, 34% to
small firms employing 21-50 workers and only 13% to firms employing
51-100 workers during the 18 months ended June 30, 1981. In terms of asset
size of borrowers,/l the trend is upwards with the weighted average rising
from W 145 million in 1979 to W 170 million (about $250,000). This 17%
rise in the average asset size of borrowers was, however, lower than
inflation during that period and therefore represented a decline in real
terms. Over 67% of foreign currency loan approvals in terms of amount (over
75% in terms of number) have been made to firms with total assets below W
250 million. CNB has satisfactorily complied with the agreed requirements
that a minimum of 50% of the Bank loan (1829-KO) for financing subprojects
be for smaller firms with assets of less than W 250 million or 50 workers.
4.35 Assistance for Modernization. Reflecting the Government's
emphasis on modernizing SSEs with a view to improving their competitiveness
both at home and abroad, the bulk (90%) of CNB's foreign currency equipment
loans have been made for modernization/expansion of SSEs. Only 16 out of
129 projects (or 10% in loan amounts) financed by CNB in foreign currency
were for establishment of new projects. This trend is likely to continue
given the Government's commitment to restoring industrial efficiency
through, among others, modernization of SSEs.
4.36 Economic Impact of CNB Financed Projects. The sheer volume and
the diversity of CNB-s operations make it difficult to compile comprehen-
sive data which would make possible quantification of CNB's contribution
to economic development. An ex ante evaluation of partial economic indi-
cators on a sample of 232 loans made by CNB during 1978-80 provides, how-
ever, an impression of the economic benefits deriving from CNB-s local
currency equipment financing. These 232 projects received CNB-s domestic
currency equipment loans totalling W 4.8 billion as against their total
capital expenditure of W 13.4 billion. These projects were expected to
create 1,970 new jobs at an average cost per job of $6,000. Incremental
annual sales generated by the projects were estimated to be W 25.1 billion,
or nearly twice the size of the initial investment outlay. The projects
were expected to generate foreign exchange earnings of W 4.0 billion ($5.8
million) a year. Incremental value added was estimated at W 7.1 billion a
year.
4.37 Economic Impact of IBRD Subprojects. CNB received the first IBRD
loan of $30 million in 1980. Under this loan, 91 productive projects were
financed as of September 30, 1981. The construction industry accounted for
28% ($3.6 million for 22 projects) of total loan commitments ($13 million)
as of September 30, 1981; the remaining projects were spread among a wide
range of industries. Bank-financed projects are expected to generate 2,114
/1 Borrowers of CNB-s foreign currency equipment loans. No data on
local currency borrowers are available.
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new jobs at an average capital cost per job of $9,600. The higher cost/job
for Bank-financed projects compared to that for domestic currency equipment
loans is due to the fact that the Bank loans have been used for financing
imported capital goods, which in turn are used in projects that are
relatively high technology-oriented and more capital-intensive than those
using domestic equipment. Fourteen /1 of the 91 projects planned export
sales of at least part of their production; their aggregate foreign exchange
earnings would be about $15.5 million annually. The Bank-financed projects
are expected to yield economic rates of return ranging from 27% to 61%
(compared with financial rates of return of 20% to 32%).
Efficiency in Resource Mobilization
4.38 In a country like Korea, where demand for funds exceeds available
supply, the ability to mobilize increasing amounts of resources has been a
determining factor of the efficiency and success of a financial institution.
CNB has been exceedingly successful in mobilizing domestic currency resources
through deposit taking from the household sector since its inception and, to a
less extent, in raising foreign currency resources from 1979. As of December
31, 1981, CNB had mobilized total resources of W 1,882 billion ($2.6 billion)
of which W 1,837 billion or nearly 98% were in local currency. Deposits
mobilized accounted for 94% of its total resources and nearly 11% of aggregate
deposits of the banking system, making it the largest mobilizer of deposits in
Korea. About 78% of CNB's deposits are short-term. Armed with the MISRS,
which CNB has the exclusive right to operate, the wide branch network and
dedicated staff, CNB has built up a stable deposit base with about 6 million
deposits accounts. The phenomenal, steady growth (at an average annual rate
of 30% since 1970) and stable nature of its deposits would enable CNB to move
prudently towards term-transformation of a portion of its large deposit
resources (para. 4.51). Foreign currency resource mobilization started only
in 1979 when ADB granted its loan of $10 million to CNB, which was followed
subsequently by an IBRD loan of $30 million in 1980 and a second ADB loan of
$30 million in 1981. Although CNB has been successful in mobilizing
increasing amounts of foreign currency resources entirely from ADB and IBRD,
alternative sources of foreign currency resources need to be identified and
developed to support its increasing level of foreign currency lending (para.
4.56).
/1 Include five textile projects, three chemical (plastic) projects, two
printing projects, and one each of ceramics, wood products, metal
products, and green tea processing.
- 34 -
Financial Position
S.
4.39 CNB's audited balance sheets as ot December 31, 1977-1980 and
unaudited balance sheet/i as of December 31, 1981 are shown in Annex 9. At
the end of 1981, CNB's total assets stood at W 2,020 billion having grown at
an average annual rate of over 35% since 1977, well above the average annual
rate of inflation of about 22% during the period. CNB's asset composition
continues to be heavily oriented toward short-term assets. Liquid assets
including cash, deposits with other domestic banks, call loans, and security
investments accounted for over 35% of total assets during 1977-81. At the end
of 1981, short-term loans represented 11.4% of CNB's total assets and term
loans accounted for 47.4% of total assets. The bulk of these term loans,
however, were extended basically on short term as reflected in the large
balance of current maturities of these loans, which stood at 73.7% of total
term loans or 35% of total assets at end 1981. Thus, current assets
have continued to represent over 83% of total assets since 1979. Moreover,
most of the remaining term loans /2 (net of current maturities), which
represented 12.5% of total assets at end 1981, were to be collected within two
years. Therefore, long-term assets (with maturity of over two years) reached
only about 5% of total assets, represented by fixed assets (2.2% of total
assets), outstanding IBRD and ADB subloans (0.5%), and other assets (2.1%).
4.40 This bias towards short-term assets reflects the fact: (a) that
CNB's assets were financed largely by deposits (88.0% of total assets),
most (about 78%) of which were short-term; (b) that the amount of long-term
borrowed funds made available to CNB has been negligible (only 0.8%/3 of
total resources); (c) that CNB's equity base had been extremely thin (only
1.3% of total assets) until late 1979 when CNB's paid-in capital increased
six-fold: and, perhaps most important, (d) that CNB's overall volume of
lending had been guided by "domestic credit ceilings (or guidelines)" under
which the Ministry of Finance determined CNB's credit expansion limit
(growth rate of loans outstanding). Because of this system, CNB tended to
make short-term loans with a view to benefitting as many clients as
possible./4 Also, CNB's limited term lending capability especially at the
branch level has made it difficult for CNB to substantially expand the term
loan portfolio.
/1 Preliminary.
/2 With the exception of IBRD and ADB subloans.
/3 Nearly 67% of this long-term tund were represented by funds drawn down
trom IBRD and ADB lines of credit.
/4 By doing so, high turnover of loan portfolio can be maintained within
the prescribed credit expansion limit.
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4.41 Despite a large portion of its debt being short-term, CNB-s
liquidity position continues to be comfortable with the current ratio of
1.1:1 and the large balance of surplus liquid assets of about W 500 billion
(nearly $720 million, net of reserve requirements). Also, its
loans/deposits ratio of 64% as of June 30, 1981 was substantially lower than
98.5%/l for aggregate figures of all commercial banks in Korea as of the
same date. CNB's equity base increased from a mere W 11 billion (or 1.3% of
total assets) at end 1978 to W 53.8 billion (or 2.7% of total assets) at end
1981 mainly as a result of a W 25 billion increase in paid-in capital in
1979. Consequently, CNB-s total debt/equity ratio declined from 77:1 at the
end of 1978 to 36:1 at the end of 1981; risk assets /2 to equity, from 31:1
to 17.5:1; and long-term debt/equity ratio as defined under the first Bank
loan to CNB, from 14.4:1 to 4.7:1, well within the contractual limit of 7:1.
4.42 A long-term debt/equity ratio of 7:1 with adjustments by excluding
current maturities of long-term debt, BOK's reserve requirements on term
deposits and remunerated installment savings was first agreed upon between
CNB and ADB in 1979. This definition and the level of long-term debt/equity
ratio were accepted by the Bank under the first Bank loan to CNB.
However, in a situation of term-transformation supported under the proposed
Bank loan, long-term debt under the existing definition may tend to get
understated. Also, it is necessary and appropriate to make both the
definition and the level of long-term debt/equity ratio for CNB consistent
with those of other DFCs in Korea. Therefore, it is proposed that CNB's
long-term debt be defined as "long-term debt (irrespective of remaining
maturity) plus long-term guarantees minus remunerated mutual installments
collected under the mutual installment savings" (which in fact represent the
portion of principal installments collected under the mutual installment
savings scheme) and provisions for retirement grants. Also, a new ceiling
of debt/equity ratio of 10:1 under the new formula is proposed. CNB's
debt/equity ratio under the new formula was 6.1:1 in 1980 and 7.6:1 in 1981
and will range 7.6:1 in 1982 to 9.2:1 in 1986 with the scheduled share
capital increase of W 10 billion a year from 1982 and onwards up to W 100
billion./3 Agreements on the new definition and new ceiling of debt/equity
ratio were confirmed at negotiations. Furthermore, the Government has
undertaken to participate in increases in CNB's share capital as needed in
the future to enable CNB to maintain the long-term debt/equity ratio
within a limit of 10:1.
/1 Loans financed by banking funds (i.e., deposits) to total deposits.
/2 Total loans outstanding minus remunerated installment savings which
represent the portion of principal installments collected under the
mutual installment savings scheme.
/3 Without the scheduled increase in paid-in capital, debt/equity ratio
would exceed the proposed new ceiling of 10:1 from 1983.
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Financial Performance
4.43 CNB-s audited income statements and cash flow statements for 1977-
80 and unaudited /1 income statement for the year ended December 31, 1981
are summarized in Annexes 10 and 11. While CNB-s gross income rose by 55%
from W 147 billion in 1979 to W 228 billion in 1980, its net income grew
nearly seven times from W 2.1 billion in 1979 to W 14.6 billion. Return on
average total assets rose from a mere 0.2% in 1979 to 1.1% in 1980; return
on average equity, from 9% to 35% in 1980. This sudden turnaround in CNB-s
profitability reflected: (a) the higher gross spread /2 brought about
mainly by the decrease in reserve requirement and partly by the changes in
Korea-s interest rate structure /3 (para. 2.24); (b) a decline in
administrative expenses relative to total assets from 4.1% in 1979 to 3.8%
in 1980; and (c) income tax holidays enjoyed by CNB (CNB and other
Government-owned financial institutions have been exempt from income tax but
they will have to pay income tax from 1982 and onwards). In 1981, CNB-s net
income declined to W 7.1 billion, reflecting a reversion of gross spread to
the 1979 level /2 and a substantial increase in provision for doubtful
accounts (from'W 1.6 billion in 1980 to W 5.9 billion in 1981). CNB's
profitability, although declined in 1981, still remained adequate with a
return on average equity of 15%. CNB increased its dividends from 10.5%
with the payout ratio of 45% in 1979 to 18% with the payout ratio of 37% in
1980. CNB proposes a dividend of 15% for 1981 with a payout ratio of 63%.
4.44 Quality of Assets. CNB-s assets are of exceptionally good
quality. Almost 40% of CNB-s assets are in liquid form; they earned a
satisfactory annual rate of return of 19.4%/4 in the first half of 1981
(down from 20.8%/4 in 1980). CNB's loan portfolio is unusually sound
particularly in the light of the large number of small loan accounts CNB is
servicing. As of June 30, 1981, CNB had W 996 billion outstanding loans in
441,535 accounts. The average size of loan accounts was only W 2.3 million
(or $3,300). The level of arrears on CNB-s loans accounted for 1.3% of
total loans outstanding as of June 30, 1981, a deterioration from 0.7% at
/1 Preliminary figures.
/2 Gross income as percentage of average total assets (ATA) minus financial
expenses as percentage of ATA. Gross spread rose from 5.1% in
1979 to 5.5% in 1980 due mainly to the expansion of loan portfolio and
income-earning liquid assets as a result of the decrease in reserve
requirements, but it, in 1981, returned to 5.1%.
/3 While the changes in the interest rate structure would allow higher
interest spread, CNB's interest spread, in fact, declined from
6.7% in 1978 to 6.11% in 1980 because most (70%) of the increase in CNB's
loan portfolio in 1980 took place in the second half of that year.
/4 The gross rates of return on CNB's liquid assets have been somewhat
higher than the gross rate of return on its loan portfolio during 1977
through the first half of 1981.
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end 1980; loans affected by these arrears, however, rose from 8.2% in 1980
to 17% at end June 1981 (Annex 12). CNB has maintained a good loan
collection performance while keeping rescheduling to about 3% of total loans
outstanding. Collections of principal accounted for nearly 95% of total
collectibles in the first half of 1981, but this represented a deterioration
over the 1980 level of 98.4% (Annex 13). The slight deterioration in CNB's
collection performance was due mainly to the recession and the Government's
tight credit policy which affected the Korean economy.
4.45 CNB-s generally good collection performance and low arrears posi-
tion largely reflect the effectiveness of its supervision and collection
procedures, its effective utilization of the Loan Readjustment Corporation
which processes foreclosures on behalf of financial institutions /1 and a
credit information system operated by the Bank of Korea. Finally about 60%
of CNB loans are made under the mutual installment savings scheme and CNB
normally requires its borrowers under other types of lending to open deposit
accounts before they receive loans. This practice, aside from increasing
the deposit base, allows the transfer of all or part of the deposit balances
to cover overdue loan installments.
4.46 Reserves and Provisions. The CNB Act requires that 25% of annual
net profit be set aside as legal reserves. Such reserves stood at W 6.9 bil-
lion at end-1981. Because of relatively low payout of dividends, CNB has
managed to accumulate other reserves and retained earnings totalling
W 16.9 billion by end-1981. Thus, total reserves and retained earnings
reached W 23.8 billion, or 2.0% of total loan portfolio as of December 31,
1981. Besides, CNB makes annual provisions for doubtful accounts; such
provisions at end-1981 stood at W 9.4 billion or 0.8% of total loans
outstanding. Given negligible level of write-offs in the past, sound loan
portfolio, and CNB's excellent collection performance, the level of CNB-s
provisions seems adequate. However, CNB may find it desirable to make
provisions for doubtful loans up to 1% of total loans outstanding with a
view to taking advantage of the Corporate Tax Code in Korea since it will
have to pay income tax from 1982.
Accounting and Audit
4.47 In accordance with generally accepted accounting practices for
banks in Korea, CNB maintains and reports its financial records on a modifie
cash basis, recognizing income on an actual receipt basis and expenses on an
accrual basis. This practice is acceptable to the Bank mainly because CNB's
assets and annual net profit are conservatively stated to the extent that
/1 Loans transferred to the Readjustment Corporation stood at W 557 million
at end 1980 and W 361 million at end of June 1981. Proceeds
of foreclosures collected from the Readjustment Corporation reached
W 254 million in 1980 and W 131 million in the first half of 1981.
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accrued interest receivable on loans would exceed any additional provisions
for doubtful interest (accrued) receivables and because CNB's audited
annual financial statements show figures on an accrual basis. According to
the auditor's report, CNB's assets and annual net profit for the year ended
December 31, 1980, reported on a modified cash basis, were understated by
W 4.9 billion and W 1.1 billion respectively. Unaudited quarterly interim
financial statements and other relevant reports required by the Bank have been
submitted to the Bank within three months after the close of each quarter;
unaudited annual financial statement and other required reports, within four
months after the close of each fiscal year; and auditor's reports, within five
months after the close of the fiscal year. The existing requirements have
been satisfactorily met by CNB.
4.48 CNB's accounts and its internal control system are examined by the
internal auditors (particularly with a view to preventing the abuse of the
electronic data processing (EDP) banking system and strengthening internal
controls), the State Audit Board, the Board of Bank Audit of BOK, the Bank
Audit Unit of the Ministry of Finance, and an external independent auditor.
San Kyong & Company, a firm acceptable to the Bank, has been CNB's external
auditor since 1979; they found CNB's 1980 accounts satisfactory.
Business Prospects
4.49 GNP grew by about 7% in 1981 and is expected to increase at an
annual growth rate of 7.6% in real terms during the Fifth Five-Year Plan
period 1982-86. Fixed capital formation is expected to grow at 9% p.a.
during the Plan period. Given the importance attached by the Government to
improving efficiency of SMIs through modernization of their facilities and
operations and to deepening the structure of Korean industries through
achieving a balance between large industries and SMIs, capital investments
in the SMI sector as a whole are expected to increase significantly during
the Plan period. CNB as an institution catering to the financial needs of
small industries has taken this factor into account in projecting the
lending operations for 1982-86.
4.50 CNB's overall lending operations are projected to grow at an annual
rate of 30% during 1982-86 (Annex 14). The envisaged growth rate of overall
lending volume is generally in line with the recent record and reasonable
given the growing credit needs of household and SSE sectors. However, as
manifested in its Development Strategy for 1982-86, CNB intends to
significantly expand its term lending activity for acquisition of fixed
investments by SSEs both in local and foreign currencies. CNB's domestic
currency equipment loans, which totalled about W 100 billion during 1977-81
with annual volume between W 17 billion and W 28 billion, are projected to
reach W 377 billion (or about $494 million) during 1982-86. The annual volume
of domestic equipment loans would increase from W 36 billion in 1982 to W 49
billion in 1983 during which time CNB would concentrate on training of large
number of staff engaging in term lending (para. 4.14). The rate of growth
would accelerate from 35% in 1983 to 40% in 1984 and 1985, but thereafter
would taper off to a normal level of 30% a year. CNB's foreign currency
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operations, which were started in late 1979, would total about $275 million
during the period 1982-86. CNB's disbursements of equipment loans during
1982-86 are projected to be about 11% of aggregate fixed capital
formation in the SMI sector reflected in the Government's Fifth Five-Year
Plan. While achievement of the targeted level of foreign currency lending
operations will depend largely on the CNB's ability to mobilize suitable
additional resources, its success in meeting the projected level of domestic
currency equipment loans will depend primarily on its ability to undertake
prudent transformation of its deposits into long-term loans and institutional
strengthening at the branch level.
Proposed Term Transformation
4.51 The average maturity of CNB's domestic currency equipment loans has
been merely 1-1/2 years (para. 4.22). This is too short for SSEs to make use
of CNB loans for fixed capital investments. It is proposed that the average
maturity of CNB's domestic currency equipment loans gradually be lengthened to
about 5 years. This would require CNB to undertake some degree of prudent
term transformation, given CNB's limited access to long-term local currency
resources (para. 4.03). CNB is, in fact, in an ideal position to do so for
the following reasons: (a) CNB's deposit base has been strong with about
6 million accounts of small deposits averaging about W 264,000 (or $385) and
has been growing steadily (from a relatively small base of W 80 billion at end
1970 to W 1,544 billion at end June-1981); (b) CNB has large excess reserves
as noted in para. 4.41; (c) in case of a liquidity crunch, CNB has access to
the Bank of Korea's "lender-of-last-resort" facility; (d) there are no
regulatory constraints which prevent CNB from undertaking prudent term
transformation; (e) the interest rate regime and banking practices in Korea
are such that there is no risk of negative spread for CNB as a result of
interest rate fluctuations. (If the interest rate structure is changed, new
rates will automatically be applied to all existing as well as new loans and
deposits with few exceptions); (f) CNB is allowed to charge a higher rate of
interest (by one percentage point) on long-term (3 to 8 years) loans than
short-term (up to 3 years) loans; and, perhaps most important, (g) "domestic
credit ceilings (or guidelines)," which had effectively encouraged CNB to make
short-term loans (para. 4.22), were abolished on January 8, 1982.
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4.52 The nature and extent of the proposed term transformation over
the period of 1982-86 are illustrated below:
Actual Projected
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
-- ----------- (Amounts in million) -------------------
Disbursements of
local currency
equipment loans W 27,917 36,000 49,000 69,000 97,000 126,000
(US$ equivalent) (40) (50) (67) (92) (126) (159)
Outstanding of
local currency
equipment loans:
Before T/T /a W 47,803 50,400 64,100 88,200 123,500 163,000
(US$ equivalent) (67) (70) (87) (117) (160) (206)
After T/T /b N.A. 55,000 73,000 118,000 177,000 258,900
(US$ equivalent) (76) (99) (157) (230) (327)
Difference /c N.A. 4,600 8,900 29,800 53,500 95,900
(US$ equivalent) (6) (12) (40) (70) (121)
/a Before term transformation. Based on the average maturity of about 1-1/2
years.
/b After term transformation. Based on the CNB's proposal to lengthen the
average maturity of its domestic equipment loans to 2-3 years in 1982 and
1983, to 4 years in 1984 and a further to 5 years thereafter.
/c The difference indicates a cumulative effect of term transformation on
equipment loan portfolio at end of each year.
4.53 The projected increase in local currency equipment loans over the
period 1982-86 reflects CNB-s willingness and readiness to expand its term
lending to SSEs in support of the Government development strategy for 1982-86.
CNB's prudence in term-tranformation is reflected in: its intention to
concentrate its efforts on upgrading the term lending capability of its
branches in 1982 and 1983 (para. 4.14) before accelerating the expansion of
term lending and transformation of deposit resources into long-term loans; its
emphasis on the quality of loans rather than on quantitative target of
equipment loans; and its plan to move gradually toward term-transformation
with due consideration being given to its liquidity position. The projected
term lending and proposed term-transformation, although manageable from the
financial standpoint, should not be viewed as inflexible operational targets
since this is a new experience for CNB, but may be used as a reasonable stan-
dard against which CNB's performance in transforming itself into an institu-
tion engaging in term lending to SSEs is measured. Accordingly, CNB
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would review CNB's term lending operations for SSEs for each year starting
with the year ending December 31, 1982 together with CNB's projections for the
following year, and on the basis of such review and consultation with the
Bank determine the level of term-transformation for the following year.
Understanding to this effect was reached during negotiations.
Resource Requirements
4.54 Local Currency Resource Requirements. CNB's local currency loan
disbursements during the five-year period 1982-86 are expected to reach
W 3,549 billion, consisting of W 377 billion for equipment loans, W 1,273 bil-
lion (net of collections) for short-term working capital loans and
W 1,899 billion (net of collections) for general populace loans. CNB's
deposit mobilization efforts will continue to be intensified, raising
additional demand and savings deposits of W 3,853 billion (69% of which will
be savings deposits) during 1982-86. CNB's success in realizing the
targeted deposit mobilization will largely depend on CNB-s ability to expand
its branch network, which would, in turn, depend on its ability to raise its
equity base./l This is one of the main underlying reasons behind the
scheduled increase in CNB's paid-in share capital by W 10 billion a year
from 1982 and onwards up to W 100 billion.
4.55 CNB expects to cover long-term local currency resources needed
for the projected equipment loans by borrowings from SMIPF (W 1.5 billion)
and BOK's rediscounting facility (W 198 billion mainly from NIF) and by
transforming of its deposits into long-term assets (W 178 billion) during
1982-86. Given the past record of CNB's borrowings from SMIPF and BOK,
which were negligible, and the Government's plan to reduce the scope and
magnitude of directed/subsidized lending program, it is doubtful that CNB's
borrowings from the two sources (particularly BOK) can reach the projected
level. It is likely that most of projected equipment loans will have to be
funded by CNB's deposit resources through term-transformation, which appears
quite feasible for the reasons stated in para. 4.51. CNB's projected
resource position statement (Annex 15) indicates that CNB would continue
to have a substantial uncommitted balance of deposit resources /1 which could
be used to cover any shortfall in CNB's borrowings from BOK and SMIPF.
/1 Under the Korean banking law, the maximum investment in bank's premises
by individual bank is limited to its net worth size.
/2 Annex 15 shows that uncommitted balances of "long-term" local currency
resources would remain above W 130 billion throughout the projection
period. Please note that the term "long-term" is used simply to indicate
those resources with "remaining maturity beyond one year." In fact, most
of uncommitted balances of "long-term" local currency resources consist of
savings and other special deposits with remaining maturity between one and
two years. Therefore, term-transformation is needed, and the large
balance of such deposits make the term-transformation possible and
feasible.
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4.56 Foreign Currency Resource Requirements. To finance expanding
foreign currency lending operations, CNB is planning to raise $250 million
over the 1982-86 period in addition to the $46 million /1 available at the end
of 1981. CNB expects that borrowings from the Bank would account for 56% and
those from ADB for 36%. The remaining gap of 8% (about $20 million) of CNB-s
foreign currency resource requirements will most likely have to be met through
tapping foreign commercial or bilateral sources of funds. However, in light
of the current unfavorable terms prevailing in the foreign commercial market
and the fact that CNB caters to the very small enterprises whose financial
needs would be better met by fixed interest rate loans than floating rate
loans, CNB hopes to cover its anticipated gap in foreign currency resources
primarily from bilateral sources. CNB has not tapped bilateral sources yet.
Nevert'heless, in view of longer-term importance of CNB's broadening its
sources of foreign exchange resources, CNB's plans for initiating foreign
commercial borrowings was discussed at negotiations and its Outline of
Development Strategy for 1982-86 reflects its intention to make best
efforts to tap foreign commercial funds at terms suitable for relending to
SSEs. Encouraged by the Bank, CNB has already started establishing initial
contacts with foreign commercial lenders beginning with Japanese long-term
credit banks.
Projected Financial Position and Performance
4.57 CNB's financial position is expected to remain satisfactory over
the next five years (Annex 16). Based on its operational and funding
programs, CNB's total assets are projected to grow at an average annual rate
of 27% to W 6,637 billion at the end of 1986. A large part of the asset
growth will be supported by deposit growth; however, due to the scheduled
increase in CNB's paid-in capital by W 10 billion a year from 1982 and
onwards up to W 100 billion, the long-term debt/equity ratio would range
from 7.6:1 in 1982 to 9.2:1 in 1986. The long-term debt/equity would remain
within the proposed contractual limit of 10:1 (para. 4.42) throughout the
projection period.
4.58 Despite the projected substantial expansion of equipment loans and
term transformation, CNB's asset structure will remain heavily skewed
towards short-term assets reflecting the structure of its resource base.
CNB's current ratio will still remain above unity throughout the projection
period. This does not necessarily mean that no term-transformation will
take place. The projected term-transformation is designed in such a way
that a portion of deposits with maturity over one year will be transformed
into long-term loans with maturity of up to 8 years to achieve average
maturity of equipment loans reaching 2-3 years in 1982 and 1983, 4 years in
1984 and 5 years thereafter. However, CNB's current ratio will fall
slightly below 1.1:1, which is the minimum current ratio agreed between CNB
/1 Including the second ADB loan of $30 million which became effective in
February 1982.
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and ADB from 1985 as a result of the projected term-transformation./l
As stated in para. 4.53, the level of term transformation for each year will
be determined annually. Therefore, adjustments could easily be made to
accommodate strict adherence to ADB's current ratio criteria, should ADB
continue to impose a specific current ratio on CNB.
4.59 Termination of income tax holidays from 1982 will significantly
affect CNB's after-tax profits. While income before provisions and income tax
is projected to increase steadily from W 14.3 billion in 1981 to W 44.5
billion in 1986, after-tax income will drop from W 7.1 billion in 1981 to W
4.6 billion in 1982 (because of income tax amounting to over 50% of before-tax
profits), but thereafter gradually increase to W 15.2 billion (Annex 17).
Return (before tax and provisions) on average total assets is expected to
remain above 0.9% of average total assets throughout the projection period.
Return (after tax and provisions) on average equity is expected to be 7.8% in
1982 and thereafter to remain above 8%, reaching 12.2% in 1986. Interest
coverage ratio would remain above 1.11 times, which is adequate (Annex 18).
5. THE PROPOSED BANK LOAN
Justification and Risks
5.01 The continued support of small-scale industries remains an
important element in Korea's industrial development strategy in view of
their contribution to regional dispersal of industry, employment creation
and growth of manufactured exports, and in light of the need for better
linkage and balance between small and large industrial firms. Export-led
manufacturing growth, which is the key thrust of the development strategy,
calls for the improvement of productivity and efficiency of Korean industry
(including SSEs) in the face of increasing competition in the world markets.
The greater availability of equipment finance to SSEs is crucial because it
is through capital investment that SSEs can modernize their facilities and
operations, thereby improving their productivity and competitiveness. The
Government is also committed to expanding and strengthening technical and
managerial extension services to SSEs for betterment of their skills. The
proposed project would, as pointed out in para. 3.07, enhance CNB's role in
financing investments which will tend to raise the productivity and
efficiency of SSEs.
5.02 The proposed loan of $30 million, which would cover about one-
third of CNB's foreign currency commitments over a two-year period during
1983-84, together with the proposed expansion of CNB's medium- and long-term
local currency equipment loan operations (reaching about $160 million
/1 CNB's current ratio is projected to be 1.09:1 in 1985 and 1986.
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equivalent in the period 1983-84) will significantly increase the flow of
equipment finance suitable to SSEs. The Bank's institution-building role can
hardly be overemphasized. For instance, without the Bank's strong support, as
evidenced by the proposed loan, for CNB's moving prudently towards
term-transformation, CNB would not have seriously considered the possibliity
of term-transformation (in view of the risks normally associated with
term-transformation). The draft "Outline of Development Strategy for
1982-86," which was discussed and agreed upon during negotiations, reflects
CNB's serious intention to transform itself into an institution engaging more
heavily in term lending to SSEs and provides reasonable basis for the Bank to
continue the process of institution building started with Loan No. 1829-KO.
5.03 Since the individual projects to be financed under the proposed
loan are not yet identified, an ex-ante quantification of their economic
impact is not possible. However, it is expected that most of subprojects
to be financed under the loan would be for modernization of small enterprises
in the manufacturing, construction, transportation and service subsectors.
Experience with the last Bank loan for similar purposes shows that the Bank
loan was used to finance a wide range of economically viable projects
(para. 4.37). Subprojects to be financed by CNB under the proposed loan are
expected to vield similar benefits. Based on the average cost per job of
projects recently financed by CNB, the proposed loan would help create
approximately 3,000 jobs.
5.04 Risks. CNB-s proposed expansion of local currency equipment loans
is desirable given the growing needs of SSEs to modernize their facilities
and operations. CNB's plan for lengthening maturities of these loans
through term-transformation is feasible given the stable nature of its
deposits and other factors discussed in para. 4.51. Among a number of
specific project objectives noted in para. 3.07, the above proposal and
plan are key features of Bank's institution-building objectives under the
proposed loan. While the proposed term-transformation is a new experience
to CNB and the projected level of local currency equipment loans is large in
absolute terms and in comparison with CNB's historical record, the projected
term-transformation in itself would neither have an adverse effect on CNB's
financial position nor entail any unusual risk, partly because CNB has
access to the BOK's "lender-of-last-resort" facility but mainly because the
term-transformation will take place gradually and the extent of domestic
currency equipment loan portfolio even after term-transformation will remain
less than 5% of CNB-s total assets (or less than 6% of its total current
assets) through 1986. However, CNB is still new to development banking and
it has yet to fully develop term lending capabilities at the branch level
which makes most of local currency lending decisions. In light of the
foregoing, the capacity of CNB to implement its intended term-transformation
without jeopardizing the quality of its expanded term loan portfolio will
be critical to the success of the project and failure of CNB to develop and
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maintain reasonable standards of term lending capabilities will constitute a
risk. However, given the CNB-s strong commitment to implementing an
extensive training program over 1982-83 before accelerating the expansion of
long-term lending operations, the good caliber of CNB-s management, the
safeguards built into the project to monitor the progress to be made by CNB
in training of its staff, its operations and portfolio quality, and the
scheduled substantial involvement of the Bank in the initial stages of the
project, the prospects for successful project implementation are good. On
balance, the risks inherent in the project are manageable and well worth
taking in view of the potential long-term benefits that are expected to
derive from the proposed project.
Main Features of the Loan
5.05 Purpose. As with the last Bank loan to CNB, the proposed loan
would be used to finance (a) 100% of the foreign exchange cost of directly
imported goods and services; and (b) 60% of the cost of machinery and
equipment domestically procured or manufactured, representing the estimated
foreign exchange component.
5.06 Eligible Enterprises. Under the first Bank loan to CNB, eligible
subborrowers are limited to small industrial, mining and transportation
firms with no more than 100 employees and construction and service firms
with no more than 20 employees, or firms with total assets not exceeding
W 500 million. However, the Enforcement Decree of the CNB Act defines SSEs
only in terms of number of permanent workers. Therefore, under the proposed
loan, eligible subborrowers would be defined only in terms of maximum size of
employment noted above./l
5.07 Subloan Ceiling. Given the increasing prices of capital goods and
growing demand for imported machinery and equipment by technology-intensive
small enterprises, the ceiling on individual subloans would be raised from
$400,000 under the first Bank loan to $500,000.
5.08 Free limit. In recognition of improving quality of CNB's
appraisal work, the free limit would be raised from $250,000 under the first
Bank loan to $300,000. Under the first Bank loan, about 30% of total loan
amount and about 15% of total number of subprojects exceeded the free limit.
This is relatively high compared with other DFCs, particularly those in
Korea; therefore, the level of the free limit will be reviewed periodically
to ensure that the Bank reviews an appropriate (about 15) but not excessive
number of subprojects.
/1 The maximum lending limits in local currency to single borrower, under
the Enforcement Decree, are W 50 million for equipment loans, W 40 million
for working capital loans and W 30 million for guarantees. These low
limits effectively prevent CNB from attracting relatively large SMIs.
- 46 -
5.09 Requirement for Financing Smaller Enterprises. As with the first
Bank loan, CNB will be required to allocate at least 50% of the proposed
loan to finance SSEs employing no more than 50 workers or with total assets
below W 250 million in order to ensure access of the smallest firms to Bank
funds.
5.10 Requirement for Geographical Dispersal of Subloans. As with the
first Bank loan, CNB will be required to allocate at least 50% of the Bank
funds to subprojects outside of the city limits of Seoul.
5.11 Requirement for Economic Rate of Return Calculation. As with the
first Bank loan, CNB will be required to calculate the economic rate of
return for all subloans above the free limit.
5.12 Debt/Equity Ratio. In order to make both the definition and the
level of a long-term debt/equity ratio for CNB consistent with those of
other DFCs in Korea, CNB-s long-term debt would be redefined under the
proposed loan and the existing loan (Loan 1829-KO) as all long-term debt and
guarantees (including current maturities of such debt) minus remunerated
mutual installment savings (which represent the portion of principal
installments collected under the mutual installment savings scheme) and
provisions for retirement grants, and a maximum long-term debt/equity ratio
of 10:1 is recommended.
5.13 Procurement. CNB will require its subborrowers to follow the
appropriate procurement procedures, which will ensure that the goods and
services to be financed by subloans be purchased at a reasonable price,
account being taken also of other relevant factors such as time of delivery
and efficiency and reliability of the goods, their suitability for the
subproject and the availability of maintenance facilities and spare parts
thereof, and, in the case of services, of their quality and the competence
of the parties rendering them.
5.14 Disbursements. The proposed loan would be fully disbursed in
four years after the loan becomes effective (Annex 19). The estimated
disbursement schedule of the proposed loan is in line with actual disburse-
ment pattern under the first Bank loan to CNB and broadly consistent with
disbursement profiles for past Bank loans to Korean DFCs. The disbursement
of the proposed loan is expected to be completed one year earlier than the
disbursement profiles for IDF sector in the region as a whole indicate.
5.15 Amortization Schedule. As is usual with Bank loans to DFCs, the
proposed loan would have an adjustable composite amortization schedule
reflecting the aggregate of the repayment schedules of the individual sub-
loans made by CNB. The proposed loan will be fully repaid within 14 years
including a grace period of 3 years. A maximum repayment period of the loan
would be one year shorter than the country terms, which is 15 years, in
view of two additional years of grace period given for the Korea Technology
Development Corporation (KTDC) project. Maximum subloan maturity will be 12
years including a grace period not exceeding 3 years; average maturity and
grace period of subloans would be around 8 years and 2 years respectively.
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5.16 Front End Fee and Relending Rate. CNB opted for payment of the
fron-end fee during negotiations. CNB will onlend the proceeds of the
proposed loan at an interest rate of 2 percentage points above its own
borrowing cost with the full foreign exchange risk to be passed on to the
subborrowers. This is in line with the general practice of development
finance institutions in Korea of relending the proceeds of foreign exchange
borrowings from international sources. Based on the current Bank's lending
rate of 11.6% p.a., the nominal onlending rate to subborrowers would be 13.6%
p.a. In addition, CNB intends to charge subborrowers a one-time fee of 1.5%
of the subloan committed to them and a commitment fee of 3/4 of 1% p.a. on the
undisbursed portion of the subloan committed to them. The 2% interest spread
is adequate to cover the cost incurred by CNB in processing subloan
applications and supervising subprojects.
5.17 Based on the relending rate of 8.25% p.a. charged by the Bank
under the first loan to CNB which became effective in August 1980, CNB's
subborrowers are charged an interest rate of 10.25% p.a. With the foreign
exchange risk assumed by subborrowers, the effective cost of Bank resources
(about 21.7% p.a. after taking into account the depreciation of Won against
the US dollar during the twelve months ended July 31, 1981) has not been
unduly subsidized relative to CNB's domestic currency loans; during the same
period, the standard lending rate for domestic currency long-term loans
has fluctuated between 19.5% and 24% p.a. While the effective foreign
exchange risk under the proposed loan cannot be quantified in advance, it
is expected to bring the effective cost of Bank funds to a level which is
positive in real terms and is comparable to the domestic currency long-term
lending rates of 16.5-18.0% p.a. (para. 2.26).
Agreements and Understandings Reached during Negotiations
5.18 During loan negotiations, agreement was reached with the Government
to the effect that the Government undertakes to participate in increases in
CNB's share capital as needed in the future to enable CNB to maintain
the long-term debt/equity ratio within a limit of 10:1 (para. 4.42).
5.19 The following agreements, which were reflected in the loan
documents, were reached with CNB on:
(a) the new definition of long-term debt and the long-term
debt/equity limit of 10:1 (para. 4.42);
(b) the ceiling of US$500,000 on the size of individual subloans
(para. 5.07);
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(c) the free limit of US$300,000 on subloans (para. 5.08);
(d) eligible subborrowers would be defined as small industrial
firms with no more than 100 employees and construction and
service firms with no more than 20 employees (para. 5.06);
(e) a minimum of 50% of the Bank loan for financing smaller
enterprises employing up to 50 workers, or with total assets
not exceeding W 250 million (para. 5.09);
(f) the ceiling of 50% of the Bank loan for financing subprojects
within the city limits of Seoul (para. 5.10);
(g) economic rate of return calculation for all subprojects above
the free limit (para. 5.11); and
(h) the treatment of front-end fee (para. 5.16).
5.20 In addition, the Bank reached understandings with CNB on the
following:
(a) CNB would adopt and implement its Development Strategy for 1982-86
which calls for among others, expanding its term lending activity
for SSEs (para. 4.50), lengthening the average maturity of its
domestic currency equipment loans through prudent
term-transformation (para. 4.51), increasing its paid-in capital
(para. 4.42), diversifying its foreign currency resources (para.
4.56), intensifying training of its staff especially branch staff
(para. 4.14), and strengthening its research activities
particularly subsector/market studies (para. 4.30); and
(b) CNB would review the average maturity of its domestic currency
equipment lending operations for SSEs by the end of each fiscal
year starting with the year ending December 31, 1982 and the
average maturity of such operations planned for the following
fiscal year, and on the basis of such review and consultation
with the Bank determine the level of term-transformation for the
following year (para. 4.53).
5.21 Recommendation. A Bank loan of $30 million with a maturity of 14
years, including a grace period of 3 years, is recommended for CNB.
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Interest Rate Structure
(percent per annum)
After
Nov. 8, 1980 Jan. 14, 1982
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Deposit Rates
Time deposits
3 months or over 14.82 14.4
6 months or over 16.92 14.6
Over 1 year 19.5 (21.6/b) 15.0
Installment savings
1 year 15.1 13.8
2 years 17.1 14.4
3 years 19.5 (22.5/b) 15.0
Property formation savings /a
I year 25.6 (15.4) No change
2 years 28.4 (16.9) No change
3 years 30.9 (18.6) No change
5 years 33.6 (20.6) No change
Demand deposits
Passbook deposits 1.8 1.8
Household checking deposits /c 14.4 14.4
Lending Rates
Operating funds
Ordinary loans
Prime enterprises 19.5 15.5
Other enterprises 20.0 16.0
Commercial notes
Prime enterprises 19.5 15.5
Other enterprises 20.0 16.0
Overdraft /d
Prime enterprises 20.5 15.5
Other enterprises 21.0 16.0
Term loans /d
Up to 3 years 19.5-20.0 15.5-16.0
3 to 8 years 20.5-21.0 16.5-17.0
Over 8 years 21.5-22.0 17.5-18.0
Export finance 12.0 12.0
National Investment Fund 20.0 16.5-17.5
Machinery industry loans 15.0 15.0
Loans with installment collateral 17.5-18.0 15.5-16.0
Loans on installment savings 17.5-18.0 15.5-16.0
Loans overdue 27.0 24.0
/a Figures in parentheses show the base rates payable by the financial
institutions; the ramainder is subsidized by Government and Employer.
/b Special interest rates on household's deposits.
7T Effective from July 1, 1981.
7T These rates are 0.5% p.a. higher for the Pusan, Daegu, Kyonggi and
Kyongnam banks, and 1.0% higher for the other local banks.
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After
Nov. 8, 1980 Jan. 14, 1982
KOREA DEVELOPMENT BANK
Equipment Loans /a
Government funds 18.5 16.5
Machine industry promotion funds 18.0-20.0 15.0-17.0
Special equipment funds 18.0-19.0 15.0-16.0
Internal funds (priority industries) 18.5-22.0 15.5-17.5
Internal funds (nonpriority industries) 18.5-22.0 16.0-18.0
Foreign commercial funds /b 11.2-12.7 15.4-15.9
Working Capital Loans
Government funds 18.5 16.5
Machine industry promotion funds 18.0 15.0
Special equipment funds 18.0 15.0
Internal funds (prime clients) 19.5 15.5
Internal funds (other clients) 20.0 16.0
Foreign commercial funds /b 12.7 15.9
National Investment Fund /a,/c 18.5-19.5 14.0-17.5
industrial Rationalization Funds /a
Direct loans 18.5-19.5 15.5-16.5
Through banking institutions 17.0-18.0 14.0-15.0
Government Special Fund Loans /a,/d 13.0-19.5 7.5-15.5
Foreign Currency Loans
Foreign commercial funds le LIBOR + 2.4 LIBOR + 1.7
USAID (3rd loan) 10.0 10.0
KfW (4th loan) 9.0 9.0
ADB (5th loan) 9.65 9.65
IBRD (3rd loan) 9.5 9.5
IBRD (4th loan) - 11.25
Penalty Rate on Overdue Loans 27.0 24.0
/a In domestic currency.
/b Exchange risk passed on to borrowers.
7c Capital and working capital loans.
/d For power development, shipbuilding, coal mining, public utilities, maritime
transportation, railways and roads.
/e Export industries only.
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After
Nov. 8, 1980 Jan. 14, 1982
SMALL AND MEDIUM INDUSTRY BANK
Foreign Currency Loans
IBRD Loan 1175-KO 10.5 10.5
IBRD Loan 1507-KO 9.9 9.9
IBRD Loan 1749-KO 9.9 9.9
ADB fourth loan 10.9 10.9
Korea foreign exchange /a
3 years or less LIBOR + 1.0 No change
Over 3 years LIBOR + 1.125 No change
Over 7 years LIBOR + 1.25 No change
Domestic Currency Loans
Same as commercial banks, KDB
CITIZEN NATIONAL BANK
Deposit Rates
Same as commercial banks
Mutual Installment Receipts
15 months 15.1 13.8
25 months 17.1 14.4
35 months 19.5 15.0
50 months 21.0 15.9
60 months 22.0 16.5
Lending Rates
Working capital loans
On remuneration basis 18.0-19.08 15.72-16.8
On bills 19.5-20.0 15.5-16.0
Overdrafts 20.5-21.0 15.5-16.0
Discount on bills 19.5-20.0 15.5-16.0
On installment savings 17.5-18.0 15.5-16.0
Populace (consumer loans)
On remuneration basis 18.0-19.08 15.72-16.8
On bills 20.0 16.0
With saving as collateral 18.0 16.0
On installment savings 18.0 16.0
Facility (equipment) loans
On mutual installment basis 18.0-19.08 15.72-16.8
On bills 19.5-20.0 15.5-16.0
/a For Y loans, add 1%.
AEP Project Deparment
December 14, 1981
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TIE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Major Shareholders and their Shareholding as of September 30, 1981
Shareholder No. of shares Amount (W mln) 7
Government 39,352,889 19,676.5 65.6
Commercial Banks
Hanil Bank 4,769,297 2,384.7 7.9
Korea First Bank 4,765,493 2,382.7 7.9
Cho-lIeung Bank 4,032,017 2,016.0 6.7
Commercial Bank of Korea 4,032,017 2,016.0 6.7
Bank of Seoul and Trust Co. 2,940,786 1,470.3 4.9
Others 107,501 538.0 0.3
Total 60,000,000 30,000.0 100.0
Source: CNB.
AEP Projects Department
December 8, 1981
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THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Policy Statement
(Adopted by the Board of Directors
on August 10, 1979)
Objective
This policy statement is aimed at prescribing CNB's major policy
measures related to rendering financial assistance for the promotion of
small-scale industry.
Scope of CNB-s Operations
CNB shall contribute to the economic development of Korea by
promoting, inter alia, the progress and advancement in small-scale industry
in conformity with the purposes as stipulated in the CNB Act, its
Enforcement Decree and the Government's policies. In order to achieve this
objective CNB will expedite the advancement of small-scale enterprises (as
defined in the Enforcement Decree of CNB Act and Loan Agreements of the
relevant foreign currency borrowings) as follows:
(a) providing various types of financial assistance such as the
lending of mutual installment remunerations (particular type of
loan), medium- and long-term facility loans, short-term working
capital loans, guarantees, etc; and
(b) engaging in the activities for the progress of small-scale
enterprises such as identification and development of new
projects, etc.
Development Policies
CNB will extend its financial assistance to the small-scale
enterprises in order to supplement their managerial and financial weakness.
Especially preference will be given to the following small-scale enterprises
which will effectively contribute to broadening the base of the national
economy:
(a) exporting enterprises designated by the Government;
(b) import-substitution industries and industries producing raw
materials;
(c) specialized enterprises or industries ancillary to large firms and
machinery industries;
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(d) enterprises with potential for export- and import-substitution;
(e) industries which will develop new products;
(f) indigenous industries and labor-intensive industries;
(g) industries effectively contributing to the enhancement of GNP and
employment; and
(h) industries contributing to industrial rationalization and
technical development.
General Operating Principles
(a) CNB will carry out its operations in accordance with sound
management and business principles and practices. It will expand its
operations in the field of small-scale industries.
(b) CNB will finance projects viable from the economic, technical and
financial point of view and it will give special attention to the quality of
management and the market prospects of projects.
(c) CNB will give assistance to applicants in the course of
application for lending and feasibility study.
(d) CNB will determine the repayment period of loans, including grace
period depending on nature, individual circumstance of the project and re-
payment ability of the borrower.
(e) CNB will appropriately supervise the use of its funds, the
progress of the project financed and the performance of the enterprise so as
to ensure that remedial action is promptly taken when problems arise.
(f) In the case of foreign currency loans, CNB will protect itself
against any loss resulting from changes in the rate of exchange between Won
and foreign currencies in which CNB's outstanding money obligations will
have to be met.
(g) CNB will exert its effort for diversified loan portfolio by
industrial sector and geographical allocation, in particular in the execution
process of local currency lending except for "Mutual Installment
Remuneration." In case of foreign capital subloan, CNB will observe the
provisions of the related Loan Agreements.
Financial Guidelines
CNB will endeavor to match maturities of its long-term and
short-term loans portfolios with maturities of its resources including
deposits.
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CNB will not seek to control any of the enterprises in which it
has financed nor will it participate in the management of such enterprises
except for the purpose of safeguarding its principal and interest.
In accordance with sound banking practices, CNB will secure
appropriate collateral for its loans and guarantees. However, in the case
of development project loans, CNB will be guided by considerations of
technical feasibility, financial viability and economic justification of the
projects and enterprises so assisted.
CNB will require eligible borrowers to finance a reasonable
portion of the total project cost from their own resources to ensure that
they have a reasonable stake in the projects financed by CNB.
Borrowers Must not be in arrears in the repayment of either
principal and interest on any existing loan.
Limits on Assistance
CNB's total commitments in any one single enterprise in whatever
form, i.e., loans, guarantees or a combination thereof, will not exceed 25%
of the sum of its unimpaired paid-in capital, reserves and surplus.
CNB-s limit on local currency loans and guarantees to any single
small-scale industry is the same as stipulated in subparagraphs 1,3 and 3-2,
paragraph 1, Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the CNB Act. However,
with respect to the lending of foreign capital for small-scale industry, CNB
is not subject to the above restrictions, but bound by the approval from the
Minister of Finance and subject to provisions of Loan Agreements of the
relevant foreign currency borrowings.
Management and Organization
CNB will cooperate with its clients in the establishment and
implementation of the planned project and will maintain effective
organization in order to enhance management capability and intensify
training for employees. CNB will also recruit sufficient number of
personnel specialized in the field of financial and economic analysis,
technique, accounting, law and so on.
Accounting
CNB will maintain adequate accounting records to reflect its
business operations and affairs in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and standards.
CNB will engage a qualified and independent public accountant to
audit its books and financial statements every year.
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Provisions and Reserves
CNB will annually make appropriate allocations to the account of
provision for doubtful loans for the protection against bad debts.
CNB will allocate at least 25% of the profits to a reserve fund
every fiscal year until the reserve fund reaches the amount of the paid-in
capital.
AEP Projects Department
January 8, 1982
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Development Strategy for 1980/81
Outline
1. This development strategy is aimed at prescribing major development
policy measures of The Citizens National Bank (hereinafter referred to as the
CNB) with emphasis given to acceleration of development activities of the CNB
for the promotion of small-scale industry.
2. Especially in parallel with the projected expansion of its financ-
ing operations in the two-year period 1980/81, CNB shall further expand,
apart from its normal financing activity, its developmental and promotional
activities particularly in the specific areas outlined below.
Priority Area of Financing
3. CNB shall contribute to the national economic development by
expediting the advancement of small-scale enterprise.
4. Thus, main emphasis shall be given to the financial assistance to
small-scale enterprises in order to supplement their managerial and financial
resources which often lack access to mot banking institutions.
5. Especially, the preference in selection of financing beneficiary
will be given to the following small-scale enterprises which will effectively
contribute to broadening the base of national economy.
(a) exporting enterprises designated by the Government;
(b) import-substitution industries and industries producing raw
materials;
(c) specialized enterprises or industries ancillary to large firms and
machinery industries;
(d) enterprises with potential for export and import substitution;
(e) industries which will develop new products;
(f) indigenous industries and labor-intensive industries;
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(g) industries effectively contributing to the enhancement of GNP and
employment; and
(h) industries contributing to industrial rationalization and technical
development.
Project Promotion and Resource Allocation
6. CNB shall make special efforts to assist an increasing number of
small-scale enterprises and labor-intensive projects in conformity with the
purposes as stipulated in the CNB Act, its Enforcement Decree and the
Government's policies.
7. In line with the Government's policy toward geographical distribu-
tion of small-scale industry to provincial areas, CNB shall make efforts to
increase the proportion of its financing to SSI located in provincial areas
by taking advantage of its nationwide branch network.
Resource Mobilization
8. CNB shall endeavor to increase the mobilization of household sav-
ings in an effort to augment its domestic currency resources and to introduce
sufficient foreign currency resources from international financial institu-
tions. CNB shall also make continued efforts to raise long-term local
currency resources from relevant institutions concerned.
Research
9. With a view to providing more diversified financial services, and
expanding its operational activities in parallel with the rapidly developing
economic environment as well as securing stable basis for mobilization of
adequate domestic currency resources, CNB shall strengthen its research
capability and activities including "Small Manufacturing Industry Survey,"
with particular emphasis given on sector studies and market studies for
small-scale industry.
Organization
10. In connection with diversification and expansion of its operational
activities, CNB shall continue, as a matter of high priority, to enhance
professional abilities of its existing staff through adequate training
courses provided by domestic and foreign institutions with due consideration
given to the fields of financial and economic analysis, appraisal technique,
accounting, law, and so on. CNB shall also adopt its organization as appro-
priate to effectively carry out its expanding activities.
AEP Projects Department
January 7, 1982
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Outline of Development Strategy for 1982-86 /1
Introduction
This statement is to clarify CNB's distinct role in the community
of Korean financial institutions and how that role should evolve through
1986 and outlines operational objectives consistent with its underlying
developmental role, its plan for term transformation and for strengthening
its equity base, its intention to tap foreign commercial funds, and its
program for building up its institutional (particularly branches) capabi-
lity for handling increased term lending operations.
CNB_s Role
CNB is a specialized bank operating for and in the household as
well as small-scale business sectors. For raising its domestic currency
resources through mobilization of deposits from the general public, CNB has
been competing with commercial banks, regional city banks, SMIB and mutual
finance companies. CNB offers all the commercial banking services for
household and small-scale business sectors; in this respect, CNB is a
commercial bank with the developmental role of promoting and serving
small-scale industry. During the five-year period (1982-1986), CNB plans
to play a more meaningful role as an allocator of resources consistent
with its underlying developmental role.
Operational Objectives
In an attempt to play a more meaningful role as an allocator of
resources, CNB shall further expand, apart from its normal financing acti-
vity, its term lending activity particularly for the advancement of small-
scale enterprises. To this end, CNB shall endeavor to extend the average
maturity of its domestic currency equipment loans to about 5 years by 1986.
This would require CNB to undertake some degree of prudent term transforma-
tion while maintaining its financial viability. Also, this would require
CNB to upgrade its term lending capability especially at the branch level.
CNB, recognizing this need, shall continue to exert its efforts for training
its staff and streamlining its procedures.
/1 As adopted by the CNB Board of Directors on April 10, 1982.
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CNB shall make special efforts to assist an increasing number of
small-scale enterprises and relatively labor-intensive projects in conformity
with the purposes as stipulated in the CNB Act, its Enforcement Decree and
the Government's policies. In addition, CNB will continue to provide finance
for modernization of small-scale enterprises in order to enhance their
competitiveness in export as well as in domestic markets.
In line with the Government's policy toward geographical distri-
bution of small-scale industry to provincial areas, CNB shall make con-
tinuing efforts to increase the proportion of its financing to SSI located
in provincial areas by taking advantage of its nationwide branch network.
CNB shall actively assist the small-scale enterprises in the
machinery subsector, to the modernization of which the Government is giving
a high priority.
CNB shall, where necessary, actively encourage and promote
subcontracting arrangements with a view to contributing to deepening the
industrial structure in Korea.
In utilizing its surplus funds, CNB shall give due considerations
to the marketability and expected rate of return on its securities holdings.
Resource Mobilization
CNB shall make continuing efforts for the mobilization of house-
hold savings and for making use of long-term local currency resources avail-
able from relevant institutions concerned. In addition, CNB shall endeavor
to increase its paid-in capital as scheduled. With a view to supplementing
foreign currency resources available from international finance institutions
and diversifying its long-term foreign currency resources, CNB shall make
best efforts to tap commercial funds at appropriate terms-suitable for
relending to small-scale enterprise during 1982-86.
Research
CNB shall continue to strengthen its research capability and
activities, with particular emphasis given on subsector studies and market
studies for small-scale industry as a means of improving the data base
required for sound project evaluation and identification of potential clients.
Organization
In connection with planned expansion of its term lending activities,
CNB shall continue, as a matter of high priority, to enhance professional
abilities of its staff through the provision of adequate training opportuni-
ties with due emphasis on appraisal and supervision techniques. CNB shall
also streamline its organization, procedures and staffing pattern as appro-
priate to effectively carry out its expanding activities.
KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Composition of Board of Directors, as of September 30, 1981
Date of
Name Position appointment Date of expiry Background
Song, Byoung Soon President Jul 30, 1980 Jul 29, 1983 Career spent mainly in MOF and its affiliated office.
Appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors of KCGF.
Appointed President of CNB July 1980.
Kim, Sang Chan Deputy Aug 01, 1980 Jul 31, 1983 Career spent mainly in CNB. Joined CNB in 1963.
President Appointed Director June 1975. Deputy President
since August 1980.
Yoo, In Ho Auditor Aug 20, 1980 Aug 19, 1982 Career spent mainly in BOK from 1946 to 1975.
Appointed Director of CNB in February 1976.
Auditor since August 1980.
Rha, Sung Woong Director Apr 07, 1980 Apr 06, 1983 Career spent mainly in CNB. Joined CNB in 1963.
Director since April 1977.
Chang, Yeung Keun Director May 07, 1979 May 06, 1982 Served in MOF. Appointed Auditor of CNB September
1977. Director since May 1979.
Kim, Nam Ho Director Aug 20, 1980 Aug 19, 1983 Career spent mainly in CNB. Joined CNB in 1963.
Director since August 1980.
Park, Jung Kyu Director Aug 20, 1980 Aug 19, 1983 Served in the Army. Joined CNB in 1970. Director
since August 1980.
Choi, Myoung Kyu Director Aug 20, 1980 Aug 19, 1983 Career spent mainly in CNB. Joined CNB in 1963.
Director since August 1980.
Source: CNB.
AEP Projects Department v
December 8, 1981
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THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Summary of Loan Operations, 1977 - Jun. 30, 1981
(Won million)'
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 (June 30)
No. Amount No. Amount No, Amount No. Amount No. Amount
Approvals /a
Working capital loans 46,412 169,163 34,377 152,463 28,805 180,269 29,104 282,132 15,170 158,724
(Net approvals) /b - (31,086) - (30,795) - (78,225) - (131,632) - (47,595)
Equipment loans
Domestic currency 4,204 17,332 5,257 17,093 5,021 19,903 3,987 17,384 1,913 10,044
Foreign currency - - - - 10 850 52 4,554 67 7,645
Total Business Loans 50,616 186,495 39,634 169 556 33,836 201,022 33,143 304,070 17,150 176,413
(Net approvals) /b - (48,418) - (47,888) 9 ( 8,978) _ (153,570) _ (65,284)
General populace loans 153,288 108,488 189,052 170,984 182,135 200,325 213,348 306,144 245,005 Z24,194
(Net approvals) /b - (42,584) - (65,793) - (50,114) - (138,988) - (103,997)
Total Approvals 203,904 294,983 228,686 340,540 215,971 401,347 246,491 610,214 262,155 400,607
(Net approvala) lb - (91,722) - (113,681) - (149,092) - (292,558) _ (169,281)
Commitments la
Working capital loans 46,412 169,163 34,377 152,463 28,805 180,269 29,104 282,132 15,170 158,724
Equipment loans
Domestic currency 4,204 17,332 5,257 17,093 5,021 19,903 3,987 17,384 1,913 10,044
Foreign currency - - - - 4 486 45 3,925 66 6,867
Total Business Loans 50,616 186,495 39,634 169,556 33,830 200,658 33,136 303,441 17,149 175,635
General populace loans 153,288 108,488 189,052 170,984 182,135 200,325 213,346 306,144 245,005 224,194
Total Commitments 203,904 294,983 228,686 340,540 215,965 400,983 246,484 609,585 262,154 399,829
Disbursements /a
Working capital loans 46,412 169,163 34,377 152,463 28,805 180,269 29,104 282,132 15,170 158,724
Equipment loans
Domestic currency 4,204 17,332 5,257 '7,093 5,021 19,903 3,987 17,384 1,913 10,044
Foreign currency - - - - - - 22 1,726 43 4,298
Add: Fluctuations due
to foreign exchange - - - - - - - 82 - (69)
Total Business Loans 50,616 186,495 39,634 169,556 33,826 200,172 33,113 301,324 17,126 172,947
General populace loans 153,288 108,488 189,052 170,984 182,135 200,325 213,348 306,144 245,005 224,194
Total Disbursements 203,904 294,983 228,686 340,540 215,961 400,497 246,461 67,468 262,131 397,191
Repayments
Working capital loans 51,116 138,077 51,947 121,668 34,689 102,044 28,724 150,500 15,585 111,129
Equipment loans
Domestic currency 6,359 10,236 4,797 13,546 6,449 14,979 4,400 18,106 1,677 8,744
Foreign currency - - - - - - - - - 17
Total Business Loars 57,475 148,313 56,744 135,214 41,138 117,023 33,124 168,606 17,262 119,890
General populace loans 94,065 65,904 143,548 105,191 182,608 150,211 181,512 167,156 123,183 120,197
Total Repayments 151,540 214,217 200,292 240,405 223,746 267,234 214,636 335,762 140,445 240,087
Outstanding
Working capital loans 72,669 174,634 55,099 205,429 49,215 283,654 49,595 415,286 49,180 462,881
Equipment loans
Domestic currency 8,146 28,738 8,606 32,285 7,178 37,209 6,765 36,487 7,001 37,787
Foreign currency - - - - - 22 1,726 65 6,007
Add: Fluctuations due
to foreign exchange - - - - - - - 82 - 13
Total 8usiness Loans 80,815 203,372 63,705 237,714 56,393 320,863 56,382 453,581 56,246 506,688
General populace loans 186,600 130,468 232,104 196,261 231,631 246,375 263,467 385,363 385,289 489,360
Total Outstanding 267,415 333,840 295,809 433,975 288,024 567,238 319,849 838,944 441,535 996,048
/a Given the nature of domestic currency operations, approvals are simultaneous
with commitments and disbursements.
/b Disbursements less Repayments.
AEP Projects Department
December 7, 1981
KORElA
TIlE CITIZENS NATIONAI, BANK
Char-uterist_c- of FIL!poent Loans Approved, 1977 - Au.e 30, 1981
(WIon .111fon)
1979 ______ 1980 ______ 1981 (lo-m 30)
197 1978 Dmtccueny orinrcey oetccrey oo6 creny omsi crecyForeign currency
No. Amiount 1 No. Akm-ount S7 No. Amount S No. A.oont No. Amount S No. Amount S No. Amuount No. Ae..unt S
Rature o_Fr Poet La 7 al 1. 1 .
New - - 7 83 1. 1 .
E.pansIon 9 719 84.6 36 2,923 64.1 57Z 6,423 84.0
8MR lb 1 131 15.4 9 818 18.0 6 607 8.0
Total 10 8590 1200. 2 454 100 67 7,645 100.0
Total Assets /a
Up Eu W 50 mtIlt-n - - - 6 359 7.9 19 1,761 23.0
W 50 - 100 .i1iiue 3 225 26.5 11 909 20.0 12 1,530) 20.0
6W )00 - 250 million 7 625 73.5 19 1,164 25.5 20 2,201 28.8
W1 250 - 500 milllon - - 7 899 19.7 13 1,678 22.0
Over 61 500 million -- 9 1,223 26.9 3 475 6.2
Total 10 850 100.0 52 4,554 10.0 67 7,645 100.0
Bombe,r of Workers
S to 20 workero 3,161 12,132 80.0 3,037 12,115 711.9 3,024 11,573 58.1 2 95 11.2 1,935 8,740 503.3 21 1.786 39.2 1,263 5,173 51.5 046 4,973 65.1
20 to 50 worker. 494 3,334 9.2 1,197 2,094 12.2 1,377 5,838 29.3 6 619 72.8 1,585 6,292 36.2 22 1,625 35.7 502 3.596 35.8 16 1.852 24.2 C31
50 to 100 workers 423 1,029 5.9 764 1,717 10.0 51.8 1,947 9.9 2 136 16.0 432 2,027 11.7 9 1,143 25.1 138 1,205 12.0 5 821, 10.2 
Su~btotal 4,07 8 16,495 95.1 4,998 1 5, 926 93.1 4,919 19,359 97.2 10 85(1 100.0 3 ,952 17,059 98.2 52 4,554 100.0 I 1.03 9,974 99.8 67 7,645 100.01
More than 100 workers 126 837 4.9 259 1,167 6.9 102 545 2.8 - - - 35 325 1.8 - - - 10 70 0.7 - - -
Total 4,204 17,332 100.0 5,257 17,091 500.0 5,021 19,903 100.0 10 i850 0. ,8(734 100 5 ,5 1(0.11 1,911 10 044 100.0 6 7,645 100.0
Size of Loans
lIp t-oWU 5 ~mIion 3,637 11,460 66.1 4,176 6,602 38.6 3,946 9,1373 45.6 - - 2,971 5,869 33.8 - - - 1,389 2,923 29.1 -- -
61 5 - 10 milltion 420 2,940 17,0 744 4,672 27.3 741 5,105 25.6 - - - 595 3,586 20.6 - - - 251 2,139 21.3 --
WI10 -. 30 million 147 2,932 16.9 337 5,919 34.1 334 5,725 29.8 - - - 517 7,755 44.6 5 132 2.9 270 4,852 48.3 4 104 1.4
W13(0 - 50 million - - - - - - - 3 112 13.2 4 17 5 1.0 13 47 2 10.4 3 130 1.3 12 500 6.5
W SO- 1i( Il1lo,, - - - - - - - 3 211 24.8 - - - 10 704 15.4 - - 16 1,135 14.9
W1100 - 200 milioi,n - - - - - - - - 4 527 62.0 - - - 23 2,993 65.7 - - - 90 4,674 61.1
Ov-r 2lIOmIllioa - - - -. - - .- - -. - - - - - - 1 253 5.6 - - - 5 1 ,2 32 16.1
To.fLI 4,704 17,332 100. 5,257 17,093 1110.0( 5,0 21 59,903 100.06 10 850 100.0 3,987 17,384 100.0 52 4 ,3554 1IWO. 1, 913 ±11, 044 10(. 0 E7 7,645 1.00.0
Our,,,l 1cv of yua-n
Ilproiyer 43 516 3.0 39 407 2.4 5 62 0.3 - - - - - - - - -. - - - - -
1 L. 3 years 2,312 9,520 54.9 2,657 10,207 59.7 3,351 14,220 71.5 - - - 2,291 9,952 57.2 - 1,173 5,715 56.9- -
3 o. 5years 1,949 7,296 42.1 2,561 6,479 37.9 1,665 5,621 28.2 - - - 1,196 7,432 42.8 6 745 16.4 740 4,329 43.1 19 2,406 11.5 :Lr
S Lo7year. - - - - - . - - 1 30 3.5 -. - - 9 615 13.5 - - - 13 1,470 19.2 ,.,
7 taif)ye.rs - 7 664 80. - - - 34 2,769 60.8 - - - 16 1,2 21) 16.0 ,-
Over lO Years -- 1 36 16.0 - - 3 4 25 9.3 - 19 2,549 33.3
Total 4,0 17,332 100.0 5,257 17,091 100.0 5,021 19,9133 11)0. 0 10 850 100.0 3 ,9 87 17,384 100.0 5 2 4 , 554 100.0 1,913 10,0144 101.11 67 1,0'45 100.11. 
1 97 9 1990 1981 (Jo.e 10)
1977 197B Domestic currenty Foreign currency Domtsttc currency Foreign curr y Domestic currency Porelsj curre.y
No. Amstooot % No. Amount I No. A..ount I No. Amount X No. Amount % No. Amount % No. Aotont % No. A6ount X
Sectoral Distributton
Manufactoritg
Food, beverage & tobacco 271 734 4.2 292 902 4.7 171 576 2.9 - - - 71 249 1.4 4 401 8.8 47 151 1.5 _ 
Textile, wearing apparel
5 leather 616 3,239 18.7 831 3,656 21.4 483 2,861 14.4 - - - 137 766 4.4 5 770 16.9 ION 633 6.3 8 
1,094 14.3
Wood & wood products 11 1,716 9.9 45 1,746 10.2 56 768 3.9 - - - 59 486 2.8 1 90 2.0 32 261 2.6 
1 184 2.4
Paper, paper products &
printing 382 1,155 6.7 427 1,11S 6.5 190 875 4.4 - - - 119 568 3.3 2 85 1.9 95 572 5.1 18 
1,458 19.1
Chemicals, petrolerno,
coal, rubber & plastic 439 1,6-6 9.3 493 1,762 10.3 268 1,082 5.4 2 2129 24.6 178 848 4.9 7 601 13.2 124 793 7.9 3 
103 1.3
Nonmetallic sineral
products 216 858 4.9 403 692 4.1 155 423 2.1 - - - 39 150 0.9 2 89 2.0 26 110 1.1 2 
186 2.4
Basic setals 249 591 3.4 292 720 4.2 124 249 1.3 - - - 58 152 0.9 1 29 0.6 19 80 0.8 
- - -
Metal prodocts, muachinery
& equipment 601 1,981 11.5 789 1,973 11.5 494 1,516 7.6 7 610 71.8 763 2,619 15.0 8 443 9.7 343 1,647 16.4 16 
1,050 13.8
Others - - - - - - 226 1,342 6.7 1 31 3.6 277 1,192 8.0 3 437 9.6 137 552 5.5 
- -
Total Ma.nfacturig 2,807 11,882 68.6 3,572 12,466 72.9 2,177 9,692 48.710 9850 100.)0 1,701 7,229 41.6 33 2,945 64.7 901 4,799 47.8 42 4,075 53.3
Mining 30 243 1.4 34 279 1.6 17 115 0.6 - - - 6 80 0.5 - - - 5 40 0.4 - - -
Transportation 39(1 1,489 8.6 491 1,387 8.1 1,436 5,105 25.6 - - - 994 4,674 26.9 1 55 1.2 517 2,722 27.1 2 
378 4.9
Construction 152 801 4.6 209 795 4.7 131 651 3.3 - - - 67 283 1.6 5 548 12.0 59 220 2.2 19 2,281 
29.9 GN
Othitrs 825 2,917 16.9 951 2,166 12.7 1,260 4,340 21.8 - - - 1,219 5,119 29.4 13 1,006 22.1 431 2,263 22.5 4 911 
11.9 >
Total 4,2(4 17,332 100.0 5,257 17,093 10n.0 5,021 19,903 101.0 113 850 100.( 3,987 17,384 10.0 52 4,554 100.0 1,913 10,044 100.0 67 7,645 1(0.0
Ceographic Distribution
Seouxl City 2,S18 9,939 57.3 3,163 9,727 56.9 2,450 8,839 44.4 8 649 76.4 1,713 7,772 44.7 25 1,750 38.4 552 4,168 41.5 25 
3,134 41.0
Kyung-gi p-ovince 160 884 5.1 189 929 5.4 292 i,507 7.6 1 136 16.0 262 1,310 7.S 9 973 21.4 156 844 8.4 14 
1,111 14.5
South Chbngchung provInce 227 555 3.2 283 581 3.4 225 874 4.4 - - - 187 759 4.4 - - - 105 382 3.8 5 
850 11.1
North Chungchung province 101 276 1.6 116 301 1.8 1O5 412 2.1 - - - 99 358 2.1 1 50 1.1 38 220 2.2 
- - -
Kang NoW- pronince 91 797 4.6 107 807 4.7 129 541 2.7 - - - 109 470 2.7 - - - 52 270 2.7 4 
534 7.0
South .leon Ra province 147 607 3.5 163 612 3.6 189 717 3.6 - - - 168 623 3.6 4 349 7.7 143 502 5.0 
3 531 7.0
North .leon Ra province 130 526 3.1 158 524 3.1 221 682 3.4 - - - 214 592 3.4 - _ - 78 310 3.1 
6 482 6.3
South Kyonga.ng province 210 814 4.7 294 821 4.8 289 1,120 5.6 - - - 301 973 5.6 3 354 7.8 217 693 6.9 5 456 
6.0 0 2
North Ky.ngsasg province 28( 1,335 7.7 364 1,345 7.9 385 1,906 9.6 - - - 328 1,656 9.5 5 532 11.7 261 1,155 
11.5 3 453 5.9
Buman City 3l7 1,461 8.4 373 1,307 7.6 691 3,151 15.8 1 65 7.6 569 2,737 15.7 4 490 10.7 295 1,440 14.3 2 94 
1.2 4
ChelJe provl-ce 33 139 '3.8 47 139 n.8 48 154 0.9 - - - 37 134 0.8 1 56 1.2 16 60 0.6 -
- -
TOtal 4, 204 17,(32 100.0 5,257 17,093 10DO11 5,021 19 9,93 I 01).o (I 8~ 0 101 .0 3,987 17,384 100.0 52 4,554 1 13. 0 1,913 10,044 (00.0 67 7,645 1(10.1 ,.
/a In case of do.-stlc currency loan, nature of pro,ect and total assets are not available.
/H 8alancing, modernization and replace.ent.
AFP Pro lecta DepartmenL
Dece-ber 7, 1991
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BVAK
Summarized Balance Sheets, 1977 - 1981
(In Won million)
As of December 31, 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
------------- (audited) ------------- (unaudited)
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash and checks 27,532 63,976 90,076 76,602 92,202
Due from Bank of Korea /a 69,379 79,646 185,053 95,090 27,559
-Deposits with other domestic banks 99,294 60,007 97,153 110,831 99,027
Foreign currency deposits 20 29 4 84 265
Short-term loans:
Business loans 5,017 4,690 53,905 67,368 114,286
General populace loans /b 4,698 23,016 42,377 51,572 116,626
Total Short-Term Loans 10,515 27,706 96,282 118,940 230,912
Securities 1,361 19,246 88,379 74,993 158,930
Call loans - 90,000 - 30,000 83,000
Current maturities
Securities and deposits 43,021 93,729 103,845 205,619 251,068
Term loans 140,081 251,804 324,941 514,441 705,598
Other current assets 2,911 5,966 6,013 18,180 30,987
Total Current Assets 394,114 692,109 991,746 1,244,780 1,679,548
Medium-/Long-Term Assets
Medium-term deposits with domestic
banks 435 239 - - -
Domestic currency equipment loans 22,271 23,407 25,116 24,629 19,000
Working capital loans 91,800 61,760 63,124 101,088 120,033
Genegal populace loans /b 69,173 69,298 57,775 78,115 112,294
Foreign currency loan - - - 1,731 10,780
Total Term Loans 183,244 154,465 146,015 205,563 262,107
Less: Provision for doubtful
loans (1,190) (924) (2,417) (3,536) (9X417)
Net Term Loan Portfolio 182,054 153,541 143,598 202,027 252,690
Equity investments 2,049 2,752 - - -
Other medium-/long-term assets 4,177 9,848 15,598 22,000 43,100
Fixed Assets
Premises and equipment (net) 8,195 10,303 26,361 32,277 44,446
Total Assets 591,024 868,792 1,177,303 1,501,084 2,019,784
/a Including BOK's reserve requirements.
/b Including households and individuals.
ANNEX 9
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As of December 31, 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
------------- (audited) -------------- (unaudited)
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Current Liabilities
Demand deposits 111,641 161,173 209,790 223,600 254,623
Time and savings deposits 190,364 291,867 438,836 629,258 902,164
Subtotal 302,005 453,040 648,626 852,858 1,156,787
Short-term borrowings 1,690 - - 190 809
Debentures issued - - 1,818 1,089 48
Current maturities
Deposits /a 42,385 78,240 170,543 186,062 225,175
Borrowings - - 333 78 440
Other current liabilities 30,658 50,699 64,951 94,815 134,674
Total Current Liabilities 376,738 581,979 886,271 1,135,092 1,517,933
Medium-/Long-Term Liabilities
Mutual installment savings /a 97,802 121,314 118,363 148,284 199,924
Time and savings deposits 41,979 60,683 26,304 41,748 67,929
Property formation savings deposits 60,194 82,779 86,981 98,805 127,228
Total Term Deposits 199,975 264,776 231,648 288,837 395,081
Borrowings:
BOK 1,500 1,500 - 77 5,537
KDB 30 27 - - -
Government 1,300 1,000 373 243 -
ADB - - - 1,731 5,152
IBRD - - - 5,948
Debentures issued 435 239 35 - -
Other long-term liabilities 16 35 - 33 -
Total Medium-/Long-Term Liabili-
ties 203,256 267,577 232,056 290,921 411,718
Provisions for Retirement Grants 1,660 8,160 21,681 28,561 36,364
Equity
Paid-in capital 5,000 5,000 30,000 30,000 30,000
Capital surplus 10 10 71 71 71
Legal reserves 1,095 1,395 1,922 2,546 6,867
Other reserves 2,575 2,925 4,124 4,675 9,732
Retained earnings 690 1,746 1,178 9,218 7,099
Total Equity 9,370 11,076 37,295 46,510 53,769
Total Liabilities and Equity 591,024 868,792 1,177,303 1,501,084 2,019,784
Ratios
Current ratio 0.63:1 0.69:1 0.79:1 0.56:1 0.57:1
Current ratio /b (ADB definition) 1.05:1 1.20:1 1.13:1 1.11:1 1.11:1
Long-term debt7 /c/equity (under ADB
and first IBRD loans) 12.4:1 4.4:1 3.7:1 3.7:1 4.7:1
Long-term debt /d/equity (new IBRD
definition) 15.5:1 20.3:1 6.7:1 6.1:1 7.6:1
/a Of which installment receipts on
remunerated mutual installment
savings 100,403 120,770 153,699 192,194 258,184
/b Current assets + current maturities - remunerated mutual installment savings to cur-
rent liabilities + current maturities - remunerated mutual installment savings.
/c Long-term debt + long-term guarantees - current maturities - reserve requirements by
Bank of Korea - remunerated mutual installment savings to total unimpaired paid-in
capital, surplus and reserves.
/d Long-term debt + long-term guarantees + current maturities - installment receipts on
remunerated mutual installment savings to total unimpaired paid-in capital surplus and
reserves.
AEP Prolects Department
March 29, 1982
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KOREA
TIIE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
/a
Summarized Income Statements, 1977 - 1981
(In Won million)
For years ended December 31, 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 /b
---------- (audited) ----------- (unaudiTted)
Income
Interest on business loans 28,460 35,133 48,170 72,690 94,731
Interest on general populace loans 16,520 26,062 36,795 58,794 94,068
Interest on foreign currency loans - - - 58 612
Interest on deposits with banks 11,306 16,625 22,758 31,417 32,082
Interest on securities 2,980 12,531 24,736 49,420 69,411
Total Interest Income 59,266 90,351 132,459 212,379 290,904
Dividends on investments 192 6 7 19 43
Fees and commissions 1,033 1,366 1,391 1,257 2,335
Other income 2,907 6,846 13,137 14,388 12,719
Gross Income 63,423 98,706 147,271 228,192 306,001
Expenses
Interest on:
Mutual installment receipts 11,033 14,059 17,773 24,172 39,125
Other deposits 31,149 48,874 77,363 129,516 177,082
Domestic currency borrowings 189 161 155 28 194
Foreign currency borrowings - - - 68 566
Total Interest Expenses 42,371 63,094 95,291 153,784 216,967
Contribution to Credit Guarantee Fund 1,143 1,044 1,307 1,092 1,473
General administrative expenses 17,524 27,070 42,154 51,224 70,891
Other expenses 761 4,394 4,505 3,151 2,406
Total Expenses 61,799 95,602 143,257 209,251 291,737
Income Before Provisions and Tax 1,624 3,104 4,014 18,941 14,264
Provision for doubtful loans 192 734 1,516 1,657 5,901
Income Before Tax 1,432 2,370 2,498 17,284 8,363
Tax 418 264 375 2,669 1,264
Net Income 1,014 2,106 2,123 14,615 7,099
ANNEX 10
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For years ended December 31, 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 /b
---------- (audited) ----------- (unaudited)
Appropriations
Dividends 378 400 965 5,400 4,500
Reserves 650 1,726 1,175 9,211 2,599
Unappropriated retained earnings (14) (20) (17) 4 -
Total 1,014 2,106 2,123 14,615 7,099
Ratios
Percentage of Average Total Assets
1. Gross income 13.2 13.5 14.4 17.0 17.4
2. Financial expenses 8.8 8.6 9.3 11.5 12.3
3. Gross spread (1 - 2) 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.5 5.1
4. Administrative expenses 3.6 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.0
5. Provisions, taxes and others 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.7
6. Net income 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.4
Other Ratios
Net income as % of average equity 11.5 20.6 8.8 34.9 14.8
Income from loans as % of average
loan portfolio /c 15.4 16.0 17.3 19.5 18.6
Cost of debt as %O of average total
deposits and borrowings /c 9.6 9.8 10.6 13.4 14.2/b
Interest spread 5.7 6.2 6.7 6.1 4.4
Dividend payout 37 19 45 37 63.0
Book value as % of par 187 222 124 155 179.0
Interest cover 1.04 1.03 1.11 1.25 1.12
/a In accordance with generally accepted accounting practices for banks in Korea, CNB
maintains and reports its financial records on a modified cash basis, recognizing
income on an actual receipt basis and expenses on an accrual basis.
/b Preliminary figures.
/c Based on average of daily balances.
AEP Projects Department
March 29, 1982
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Summarized Cash Flow Statement, 1977 - June 30, 1981
(In won million)
01/01-06/30
Years ended December 31, 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Sources
Operations:
Net income 1,014 2,106 2,123 14,615 20,716
Noncash charges /a 2,645 8,740 16,242 12,871 -
Less:
Noncash profit /b - 983 600 618 -
Subtotal 3,659 9,863 17,765 26,868 20,716
Received in mutual installment
receipts 129,590 161,458 197,718 237,823 140,654
Received in deposits 7,100,107 12,502,659 19,675,858 26,483,329 13,527,638
Borrowings: Bank of Korea 35 - 279 662 2,783
ADB - - 1,808 2,010
IBRD - - - - 2,219
Others 16,750 153,390 12,170 347,150 61,870
Issued property formation
debentures -- 2,148 1,285 -
Increase in other liabilities 224,494 282,881 700,351 1,043,308 716,583
Increase in paid-in capital 500 - 11,200 - -
Subtotal 7,471,476 13,100,388 20,599,724 28,115,365 14,453,757
Collections:
Domestic currency business
loans 148,313 135,197 117,023 168,606 119,873
Foreign currency loans - - - - 17
General populace loans 65,886 105,191 150,211 167,156 120,197
Call-loans 684,040 1,481,900 3,762,300 2,908,800 1,078,600
Withdrawn in deposits with
domestic banks 1,383,147 3,804,704 5,136,881 5,989,936 2,663,116
Sale of securities 47,758 236,769 95,094 343,918 78,196
Sale of premises and equipments 255 1,539 102 216 696
Decrease in other assets 4,996 9,916 11,285 14,239 20,189
Subtotal 2,334,395 5,775,216 9,272,896 9,592,871 4,080,878
Total Sources 9,809,530 18,885,467 29,890,385 37,735,104 18,555,351
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01/01-06/30
Years ended December 31, 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Uses
Disbursements:
Domestic currency business
loans 186,495 169,556 200,172 299,516 168,768
Foreign currency loans - - - 1,808 4,229
General populace loans 108,488 170,984 200,325 306,144 224,194
Call-loans 684,040 1,571,900 3,672,300 2,938,800 1,112,600
Deposited with domestic banks 1,502,902 3,796,147 5,278,353 5,904,159 2,675,268
Purchase of securities 50,135 285,406 172,414 441,798 99,912
New premises and equipments 1,334 3,996 1,708 7,277 3,497
Increase in other assets 7,159 18,636 17,105 32,048 23,556
Subtotal 2,540,553 6,016,625 9,542,377 9,931,550 4,312,024
Withdrawn in mutual installment
receipts 101,587 131,299 156,190 197,462 104,730
Withdrawn in deposits 6,925,080 12,281,127 19,462,625 26,246,750 13,346,867
Repaid against borrowings 15,504 499 14,270 348,007 63,982
Decrease in other liabilities 211,742 418,135 687,224 1,020,760 722,853
Subtotal 7,253,913 12,831,060 20,320,309 27,812,979 14,238,432
Paid dividends 314 378 400 965 5,400
Paid retirement grants 689 951 1,228 3,084 358
Subtotal 1,003 1,329 1,628 4,049 5,758
Total Uses 9,795,469 18,849,014 29,864,314 37,748,578 18,556,214
/a Including depreciation on tangible fixed assets, provisions for doubtful loans, and pro-
visions for retirement grants.
/b Including transfer of remaining amount of provisions for doubtful loans.
AEP Projects Department
December 29, 1981
KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL RANK
Analysis of Loan Portfolio in Arrears, 1977 - June 30, 1981
(In won million)
1980 June 30, 1981
Foreign Foreign
1977 1978 1979 Total loans currency loans Total loans currency loans
Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Nuimber Amotint Number Amount Number Amount Number Amouint
A. Portfolio Status
Total loans outstanding 267,415 333,840 295,809 433,975 288,024 567 238 319,849 838,904 22 1,808 441,535 996,048 65 6,020
Less: Outstanding loans in
grace period 295 3,960 358 4,416 284 4,076 382 5,695 22 1,808 366 8,512 62 5,712
Loans in repayment stage 267,120 329,880 295,451 429, 559 287,740 563,162 319 467 833 249 - - 441,169 987,536 3 308
Outstanding amount of loans
affected by arrears 31,485 38,542 31,502 41,648 28,946 50,180 30,481 68,665 - - 66,388 169,024 2 277
Arrears
Principal 31,485 2,293 31,502 2 447 28,946 3,146 30,481 5 ,542 - - 66,388 13,154 2 -
Interest 1,062 2,119 4,097 5,696 - /b
Total Arrears 3 355 4,566 7 243 11,238 _
Loans affected by arrears
as % of total loans out-
standing 11.8 11.5 10.7 9.6 10.0 8.8 9.5 8.2 15.0 17.0 4.6
Total arrears as X of total
loans outstanding 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3
Total arrears of principal 4
as x of total loans in F
repayment stage 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.3 -
Collection rate (X)
Principal 93.7 99.0 98.8 98.4 94.8 100.0
Interest 97.7 96.7 95.4 95.8 -
Total 98.4 98.5 98.0 97.7 -
B. Rescheduling
Principal amount rescheduled
(of which due at the time
of rescheduling) 3,266 6,448 5,147 16,228 3,830 22,588 5,342 36,028 3, 957 29,651
Rescheduling as % of out-
standing loans 1.9 3.7 4.0 4.3 3.0
C. Write-Offs
Loans written off 702 18 21 17 17 14 7 17 -
Write-offs as % of out-
standing loans 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002
D. Loan Amount Consigned to the
Korea Readjustment Corporation
for Collection is
Consigned to RAC 3 26 8 105 11 145 65 557 16 361
Principal affected as % of
outstanding loans O.008 0.024 0.026 0.067 0.036
Collected 2 13 2 48 10 107 39 254 8 131 z
/a These amounts are Included in arrears shown above.
7i Interest arrears as of June 30, 1981 are not avatlable.
AEP Projects Oepartment
December 29, 1981
KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Collection Performance, 1977 - June 30, 1981
(In won million)
Maturing during
Overdue the year Total during the year Actual collection Collectton rate (%)
Prin- Inter- Prin- Inter- Prin- Inter- Prin- Inter- Prin- Inter-
cipal est cipal est cipal est Total cipal est Total cipal est Total
Equipment Loans in
Domesttc Currency
1977 193 82 7,459 3,401 7,652 3,483 11,135 7,450 3,424 10,874 97.4 98.3 97.7
1Q78 202 59 7,754 3,R94 7,996 3,953 11,909 7,723 1,833 11,556 97.1 97.0 97.0
1979 233 120 14,903 5,609 15,136 5,729 20,865 14,979 5,622 20,601 99.0 98.1 98.7
l9gn 157 107 17,995 7,308 18,152 6,059 24,211 18,016 5,943 23,959 99.3 98.1 99.0
.June 30, 1981 136 116 8,885 - 9,021 - - 8,744 3,219 11,963 96.9 - -
Equtipment Loans in
Foretgn Currency
1980 - - - 58 - 58 58 - 58 58 - 100.0 100.0
June 30, 1981 - - 17 - 17 - - 17 152 169 100.0 -
Working Capital
Loans to Industries
1977 1,157 566 90,312 25,136 91,469 25,702 117,171 90,236 25,036 115,272 98.7 97.4 98.4
1978 1,233 666 126,288 31,458 127,521 32,124 159,645 126,124 31,300 157,424 98.9 97.4 98.6
1979 1,397 824 102,369 43,109 103,766 43,933 147,699 102,044 42,548 144,592 98.3 96.8 97.9
1980 1,722 1,385 152,306 66,326 154,028 69,067 223,095 150,590 66,747 217,337 97.8 96.6 97.4
June 30, 1981 3,437 2,319 115,321 - 118,758 - - 111,129 41,139 152,268 93.6 - -
General Populace
Loans
1977 820 225 70,275 16,632 71,095 16,857 87,952 70,237 16,520 86,757 98.8 98.0 98.6
1978 858 337 108,620 26,900 109,478 27,237 136,715 108,661 26,062 134,723 99.3 95.7 98.5
1979 817 1,175 150,661 38,225 151,478 39,400 190,878 150,211 36,795 137,006 99.2 93.4 98.0
1980 1,267 2,605 167,857 59,449 169,124 62,n54 231,178 167,156 58,794 225,950 98.8 94.7 97.7
June 30, 19R1 1,969 3,261 123,476 - 125,445 - - 120,197 40,981 161,178 95.8 -
Total
1977 2,170 873 168,046 45,169 170,216 46,042 216,258 167,923 44,980 212,903 98.7 97.7 98.4
1978 2,293 1,062 242,662 62,252 244,955 63,314 308,269 242,508 61,195 303,703 99.0 96.7 98.5
1979 2,447 2,119 267,933 86,943 270,380 89,062 359,442 267,234 84,965 352,199 98.8 95.4 98.0
1980 3,146 4,097 338,18 133,141 341,304 137,238 478,542 335,762 131,542 467,304 q8.4 95.8 97.7
Jutne 30, 1981 5,542 5,696 247,699 - 253,241 - - 240,087 85,491 325,578 94.8 - -
AEP Projects Departmnent
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THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Projected Lending Operations, 1982-86
(In won million)
1981 1982 /c 1983 1984 1985 1986
(Actual)
Approvals
Business loans
Equipment loans
Domestic currency /a 27,917 36,000 49,000 69,000 97,000 126,000
Foreign currency lb 11,050 25,608 34,080 38,340 46,860 55,380
Working capital loans /a 335,949 404,000 561,000 721,000 933,000 1,214,000
General populace loans /a 508,026 790,000 740,000 970,000 1,260,000 1,640,000
Total Approvals 882,942 1,255,608 1,384,080 1,798,340 2,336,860 3,035,380
Commitments
Business loans
Equipment loans
Domestic currency /a 27,917 36,000 49,000 69,000 97,000 126,000
Foreign currency /b 11,903 23,826 33,725 37,630 41,150 53,960
Working capital loans /a 335,949 404,000 561,000 721,000 933,000 1,214,000
General populace loans /a 508,026 790,000 740,000 970,000 1,260,000 1,640,000
Total Commitments 883,795 1,253,826 1,383,725 1,797,630 2,336,150 3,033,960
Disbursements
Business loans
Equipment loans
Domestic currency /a 27,917 36,000 49,000 69,000 97,000 126,000
Foreign currency /b 9,812 22,934 31,595 36,565 44,020 51,830
Working capital loans /a 335,949 404,000 561,000 721,000 933,000 1,214,000
General populace loans /_ 508,026 790,000 740,000 970,000 1,260,000 1,640,000
Total Disbursements 881,704 1,252,934 1,381,595 1,796,565 2,334,020 3,031,830
/a No time lag is assumed between approval, commitment and disbursement for domestic currency loan.
/b Exchange rate is assumed: US$1.00 = W 710.
7c The figures for 1982 are based on operational plan approved by the Ministry of Finance.
AEP Projects Department
February 9, 1982 z
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Forecast of Resource Position and Requirements, 1982-86
(In won million)
1981 1982 L983 1984 1995 1986
(Actual)
1. Domestic Currency Resources (Won million)
A. Long-Term Resources
Equity: Paid-in capital 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000
Reserves and retained earnings 23,769 23,932 2q,539 37,008 45,302 53,976
Total Equity 53,769 63,832 79,539 97,008 11S,302 133,976
Borrowings: Government 145 - - - - -
BOK 5,537 13,000 23,000 35,000 48,Q23 60,333
S!tIPC - 100 300 600 1,000 1,500
Deposits /a 395,081 490,800 614,640 741,180 910,200 1,161,640
Total Borrowings 400,763 503,9)O0 637,940 776,780 960,121 1,221,473
Total Long-Term Domestic Currency Resources 454,532 567,732 717,479 873,788 1,075,425 1,357,449
Less: Term loans outstanding la 251,327 313,542 383,000 468,000 604,000 818,000
Fixed assets (net) 44,446 63,738 78,538 96,888 114,788 132,388
B3O-s reserve requirements 4,921 5,874 7 352 8,250 10,189 13,290
Other long-term assets 41,100 49,928 63,882 74,399 85,907 98,707
Total T.ong-Term Lendingnd nvestrments 343,796 432,982 532,772 647,537 814,984 1,062,375
Long-Term Resources Available for Further and Disbursement 110,736 134,750 184,707 226,251 260,941 295,074
B. Short-Term Resources
Deposits 1,381,962 1,909,200 2,265,360 2,918,820 3,589,800 4,468,360
Short-term borrowings from BOK and other banks 954 1,500 2,200 3,000 4,077 8,167
Total Short-Term Domestic Currency Resources 1,382,916 1,810,700 2,267,560 2,921,820 3,593,877 4,476,527
Less: Short-term loans outstanding 936,215 1,554,000 1,807,000 2,282,000 2,926,000 3,752,000
BO3-s reserve requirement 42,590 55,352 69,313 89,179 109,601 136,591
Total Short-Term Lending and Investments 978,805 1,609,352 1,876,313 2,371,179 3,035,601 3,888,591
Short-Term Resources Availahle for Further and Disbursement 404,111 201,348 391,247 550,641 558,276 587,936
C. Total Domestic Currency Resoutrces
Total long-term resources 454,532 567,732 717,479 873,788 1,075,425 1,157,449
Total short-term resources 1,382,916 1,810,700 2,267,560 2,921,820 1,593,177 4,476,527
Total Domestic Currency Resouirces 1,817,448 2,378,432 2,985,039 3,795,609 4,669,302 5,833,976
Less: Total long-term lending and investments 343,796 432,982 532,772 647,517 814,984 1,062,175
Total short-term lending and investments 978,805 1,609,352 1,876,313 2,371,179 3,035,601 3,R88,591
Subtotal 1,322,601 2,042,314 2,409,085 3,018,716 3,850,485 4,950,966
Total Domestic Currency Resources Available for Further
Disbursement 514,847 336,098 575,954 776,892 818,817 883,010
2. Foreign Currency (U$ million)
Ulncommitted resources 33 46 52 45 32 27
Borrowings from:
ADB 30/b - 40 - 50 -
I 3RD - 30 - 40 - 60
I3RD (Machinery Industry Project) - 10 - - -
Other - - - - 10 10
Total Foreign Cturrency Resources 63 86 92 85 92 97
New loan commitments 17 14 47 53 65 76
Year-End Foreign Currency Resource Position 46 52 45 32 27 21
/a Net of current maturities.
/b The second ADB loan is expected to become effective in February 1982.
AE7 Projects Department
February 9, 1992
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KOREA
TITE CITIZENS NATIONAL sBANŽ
Projected Balance Sheets, 1982-86
(In Won million)
Years ending December 31, 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
(Actual)
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash and checks 92,202 110,600 132,800 159,300 191,200 229,400
Due from Bank of Korea 27,559 61,226 76,665 97,429 119,790 149,871
Deposits with other domestic
banks 99,027 63,000 130,000 180,000 182,000 191,000
Foreign currency deposits 265 500 900 1,500 2,500 4,000
Short-term loans
Business 114,286 148,000 189,000 243,000 315,000 409,000
General populace 116,626 226,000 249,000 307,000 391,000 505,000
Total Short-Term Loans 230,912 374,000 438,000 550,000 706,000 914,000
Securities maturing within
a year 158,930 13,000 137,000 212,000 167,000 119,000
Call loans 83,000 43,000 52,000 62,000 74,000 89,000
Current maturities
Securities and deposits 251,068 314,000 393,000 491,000 61,3000 766,000
Term loans
Working capital loans 277,327 367,000 485,000 641,000 935,000 1,176,000
Domestic currency equip- 
ment loans 28,803. 31,000 24,000 38,000 45,000 70,000
Foreign currency equip-
ment loans 295 997 2,824 5,368 8,908 13,556
General populace loans 399,173 782,000 860,000 1,053,000 1,240,000 1,592,000
Other current assets 30,987 25,566 32,568 61,140 98,858 155,424
total Current Assets 1,679,548 2,185,889 2,764,757 3,551,737 4,383,256 5,469,251
Medium-/Long-Term Assets
Term loans:
General populace loans 112,294 120,093 138,000 177,000 326,000 430,000
Working capital loans 120,033 169,449 196,000 211,000 146,000 200,000
Domestic currency equip-
ment loans 19,000 24,000 49,000 80,000 132,000 188,000
Foreign currency loans 10,780 33,037 61,808 93,005 128,117 166,391
Total Term Loans 262,107 346,579 444,808 561,005 732,117 984,391
Less: Provisions for doubtful
loans (9,417) (15,198) (20,445) (27,345) (36,278) (47,805)
Net Term Loan Portfolio 252,690 331,381 424,363 533,660 695,839 936,586
Other medium-/long-term assets 43,100 49,828 63,882 74,399 85,907 98,707
Fixed Assets
Premises and equipment (net) 44,446 63,738 78,538 96,888 114,788 132,388
Total Assets 2,019,784 2,630,836 3,331,540 4,256,684 5,279,790 6,636,932
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Years ending December 31, 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
(Actual)
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Current Liabilities
Demand deposits 254,623 299,000 374,400 475,800 585,000 731,900
Time and savings deposits 870,655 1,161,700 1,465,000 1,885,000 2,295,000 2,846,000
Property formation savings
deposits 31,509 81,000 111,OO 165,000 230,000 300,000
Subtotal 1,156,787 1,541,700 1,950,400 2,525,800 3,110,000 3,877,900
Borrowing from BOK R09 1,500 2,200 3,000 4,000 * 5,500
Debentture issued 48 - - - -
Current maturities
Deposits 225,175 267,500 314,960 393,020 479,800 590,460
Domestic currency borrowings 145 - - - 77 2,667
Foreign currency borrowings 295 997 2,824 5,368 8,908 13,556
Other current liabilities 134,674 175,000 228,000 296,000 185,000 500,000
Total rurrent Liabilities 1,517,933 1,986,697 2,498,384 3,223,188 3,987,785 4,990,083
Medium-/Long-Term Liabilities
Mutual installment receipts 199,924 263,800 330,400 419,800 516,100 645,800
Time and savings deposits 67,929 88,900 111,140 121,480 153,800 197,540
Property formation savings
deposits 127,228 138,100 173,100 199,900 240,300 313,300
Subtotal 395,081 490,800 614,640 741,180 910,200 1,161,640
Borrowings from:
BOK 5,537 13,000 23,000 35,000 48,923 60,333
SMIPC - 100 300 600 1,000 1,500
AOB 5,152 12,375 26,311 47,190 54,559 77,986
IBRD 5,948 20,662 35,477 45,815 73,558 88,405
Total Medium-/Long-Term Lia-
bilities 411,718 536,937 699,748 869,785 1,088,240 1,389,864
Provisions for retirement grants 36,364 43,370 53,869 66,703 88,463 123,009
Equity
Paid-in capital 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000
Capital surplus 71 71 71 71 71 71
Reserves and retained earnings 23,698 23,761 29,468 36,937 45,231 53,905
Total Equity 53,769 63,832 79,539 97,008 115,302 133,976
Total Liabilities and equity 2,019,784 2,630,836 3,331,540 4,256,684 5,279,790 6,636,932
Current ratio /a (ADB definition) 1.11:1 1.11:1 1.11:1 1.10:1 1.09:1 1.09:1
Long-term debt/equity /b (existing
definition) 4.7:1 5.4:1 6.0:1 6.2:1 6.6:1 6.9:1
Long-term debt/equity /c (new IBRD
definition) 7.6:1 7.6:1 8.0:1 8.5:1 8.9:1 9.2:1
/a Current assets + current maturities of loans to current liabilities + current maturities of debts.
7 Long-term debt + long-term guarantees - current maturities - reserve requirements by 30K -
remunerated mutual installment savings to total equity.
/c Long-term debt (excluding provisions for retirement grants) + long-term guarantees - remunerated
mutual installment savings to total equity.
AEP Projects Department
February 9, 1982
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Projected Income Statements, 1982-86
(In Won million)
Years ending December 31, 1981 /a 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
(Actual)
Income
Interest on business loans 94,731 108,750 137,128 175,725 227,073 294,722
Interest on general populace
loans 94,068 147,037 193,582 226,910 284,778 365,468
Interest on foreign currency
loans 612 2,097 5,232 9,697 14,203 19,558
Interest on deposits with
domestic banks 32,082 25,154 25,200 34,725 41,475 45,825
Interest on securities 66,703 58,607 60,638 81,000 96,900 107,025
Interest on call loans 2,708 10,080 7,600 9,120 10,880 13,040
Total Interest Income 290,904 351,725 429,380 537,177 675,309 845,638
Dividends on investments 43 50 50 50 50 50
Fees and commissions 2,335 3,036 3,946 5,130 6,669 8,670
Other income 12,719 13,031 13,945 15,026 16,596 18,598
Gross Income 306,001 367,842 447,321 557,383 698,624 872,956
Expenses
Interest on mutual installment
receipts 39,125 49,534 55,155 67,416 83,194 103,279
Interest on deposits 177,082 204,309 253,069 317,687 396,380 492,074
Interest on borrowings from
BOK/Gov-t/SMIPC 194 1,020 2,013 3,223 4,645 6,241
Interest on foreign borrowings 566 1,680 4,285 8,073 11,887 16,407
Total Interest Expenses 216,967 256,543 314,522 396,399 496,106 618,001
Contribution to Credit Guaran-
tee Fund 1,473 1,948 2,524 3,234 4,179 5,424
General administrative expenses 70,891 90,927 109,312 130,575 160,490 198,988
Other expenses 2,406 2,900 3,486 4,183 5,020 6,024
Total Expenses 291,737 352,318 429,844 534,391 665,000 828,437
Income Before Provisions and Tax 14,264 15,524 17,477 22,992 32,829 44,519
Provisions for doubtful loans 5,901 5,816 5,335 7,102 9,332 12,234
Income Before Tax 8,363 9,708 12,142 15,890 23,497 32,285
Tax 1,264 5,145 6,435 8,421 12,453 17,111
Net Income 7,099 4,563 5,707 7,469 11,044 15,174
- 78 -
ANNEX 17
Page 2 of 2
Years ending December 31, 1981 /a 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
(Actual)
Ratios
Percentage of Average Total
Assets
1. Gross income 17.4 15.8 15.0 14.7 14.7 14.7
2. Financial expenses 12.3 11.0 10.5 10.4 10.4 10.4
3. Gross spread (1 - 2) 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3
4. Administrative expenses 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.4 3.3
5. Income before tax and
provisions 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
6. Net income O.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Net Profit as % of
Average equity 14.8 7.8 8.0 8.5 10.4 12.2
Share capital 23.7 11.4 11.4 12.4 15.8 19.0
(Average share capital) (23.7) (13.0) (12.7) (13.6) (17.0) (20.2)
Other Ratios
Return on total assets /b 13.1 11.4 11.0 10.9 10.9 10.9
Book value as % of par 179 160 159 162 165 167
interest cover ratio /c 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.12
/a Unaudited, provisional and preliminary figures.
/b Income before tax plus interest expenses to total assets.
/c Income before tax plus noncash expenses and interest to interest charges.
AEP Projects Department
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Th1 CITIZENS NATIOYAL SAIlK
Projected Cash Flow Statements, 1982-86
(In won i ILIton)
Year endinst Decemtber 31, 1991 1982 1993 1984 1985 1986
(Actual)
Sources
nperat tons:
'et tnoome 7,099 4,563 5,707 7,469 t11.064 15,174
'ionc.sh charges 16,649 18,98i 23,347 29,550 36,943 45,927
S utntal 21,747 23,544 29,ns4 37,019 47,9Z7 61,tnt
Increase in ieposits:
luctual tnstallment receipts R4,798 tn3,042 1t7,100 144,300 155,400 200,050
Demend deposIts 11,023 44,377 75,400 1t1,403 109,200 146,900
SaYing, deposits 276,140 309.907 321,640 435,240 469,720 63n,540
Property formatton savtngs depoitt 57,325 65,631 73,660 tig,o60 106,680 143,510
Subtotal 449,296 522,957 580 ,000 3 840,000 1,110,000
Bnrrhwtntns:
351( 17,980 23,154 30,200 37,800 48,n00 58,500
sn9 c 
- ton 200 300 400 500
ADti 3,726 7,S10 14,910 23,430 11,160 29,110
9llR 6,086 15,104 12,425 8,R75 291,400 18,815
I5RD ('achtnery InIustry Project) - - 4,260 4,260 4,260 3,905
Others 116,100 - - - -
Subtota1 364,092 45,8i8 6t,99S 74,665 92,420 11r,8l n
Losn colt-ctltons:
lomestic cu,rrencv bustenes loans 256,190 26n,000 406,449 520,0no 670,000 970,00o
tenerttl populace loans 265, 26 2qn,000 621,093 680,000 840,000 1,070,0n0
Call loans 2,788.400 6,300,000 4,75n,000 5,700,000 6,n0O,000 8,150,000
.r5 suhIbloana 625 157 486 954 2,571 3,991
19RV suboIan. l21 131 511 1,R70 2,797 4,917
sultot tl i,1n,411 6,950,295 5,779,539 6,9n2,824 8,315,169 1n0098,908
Increase In other tiahtltties 1,922.415 2,347,632 3,053,199 3.96A,614 5,162,04n 6,723,746
I,cre.se In pa.'l-ii ctplttl 
- In,non In,no0 10,0o0 lo0n,n I0n,n00
Sale of se,-rttes '00,571 4n7,n00 116,000 392,000 560n,00 503,O0
SAle of fixnr assets ,2t1 1,O00 1,400 1,g00 2,400 2,9no
DecreAse in other assets 139,759 167,n0 200,no0 240,0O0 289,00n 145,000
lotal Sources 6,311,513 10 375 296 9,810,187 12,397,042 1,3122,135 I19 S 3t95
Uses
llsbursement of losns:
Iomesttc currency business loans 163,966 441,000 610,000 790,000 1,030,000 1,340,000
General populace loans 508,026 790,000 740,000 970,000 1.260,OoOO 1,640,000
AD0 subloans 3,726 7,709 14, 910 23,430 11,36n 29,110
13RD subloans 6,096 15,225 12,425 9,875 28,400 18,815
13RD subloans (iachinery Industry
Project) . - - 4,260 4,260 4,26n 1,905
Call loans 2,841,400 6,260,000 4,759,000 5,710,000 6,812,000 R,165,000
Subtotal 1,721,04 7.512,914 6,140,595 7,506,565 9,146,020 1t,196,8nn
Repayment of borrowtgn9:
qOKDtOD 11,902 15,O0D 19,500 25,000 13,000 43,000
Government 98 145 - - -
A0R 225 157 496 954 2,S71 3,991
l8Rn 
- 138 S51 1,870 2,797 4,3l7
nthers 13 7,1373 49 
-
Subtotal 149,548 15,41P 20,497 27,A24 3R,36R 51,908
Increase in leposits with 'lamesttc
hanks (69,1936) 8,501 96,R89 58,164 46,361 66,591
Investnt In securities 32i,R9l 101,474 305,00n 538,000 616,000 592,00O
New premises and equipment 16,176 23,292 25,000 25,000 25,000 25,000
Increase (n other assets 162,761 177,209 215,056 278,089 317,236 415,366
Payment of dittdends 5,400 4,500 - - 2,750 6,500
Payment of retirement grants 1,170 1,500 2,000 2,700 3,500 5,000
Decrease tn other lIabilities 1,776,997 2,310,000 3,003,000 3,904,000 5,075,000 6,598,000
Total Tess 6 295 913 10 356 898 9 907 987 12 370 514 15 290 235 18 T47 195
Cash balance - heqinning 76,602 92,202 110,600 132,900 159,300 191,200
Increase (or decrease) 15,600 18,198 22,2nO 26,500 31,900 39,200
Cash 9atance - End 92,202 110,600 132,800 159,300 191,200 229.400
AEP Projects Department
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Estimated Commitments and Disbursements of Proposed Bank Loan /a
Commitments Disbursements
Amount % /b Amount % /b
FY83
July-September 1982 - -
October-December 1982 0.2 0.7 - -
January-March 1983 1.0 4.0 0.1 0.3
April-June 1983 2.0 10.7 0.5 2.0
Subtotal 3.2 10.7 0.6 2.0
FY84
July-September 1983 4.0 24.0 1.0 5.3
October-December 1983 5.0 40.7 3.4 16.7
January-March 1984 5.0 57.3 4.5 31.7
April-June 1984 4.8 73.3 4.5 46.7
Subtotal 18.8 73.3 13.4 46.7
FY85
July-September 1984 3.0 83.3 4.0 60.0
October-December 1984 3.0 93.3 3.5 71.7
January-March 1985 2.0 100.0 2.5 80.0
April-June 1985 2.0 86.7
Subtotal 8.0 100.0 12.0 86.7
FY86
July-September 1985 1.5 91.7
October-December 1985 1.0 95.0
January-March 1986 0.5 96.7
April-June 1986 0.5 98.3
Subtotal 3.5 98.3
FY87
July-September 1986 0.5 100.0
Total 30.0 100.0 30.0 100.0
/a Assuming that the proposed loan would become effective during the second
quarter of FY83.
/b Percentages are cumulative.
AEP Projects Department
February 9, 1982
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KOREA
THE CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK
Selected Documents and Data Available in the Project File
A. Selected Reports and Studies on the SMI Sector
A-1 Study on Long-Term Development Plan and Promotion Policy
for Small and Medium Industry in Korea (1982-1991), SMIPC
and Korea Industrial Development Institute (KID)
A-2 Study on National Extension Services for SMIs, MCI
A-3 MCI Announcement No. 82-1 dated January 21, 1982 on
Extension Services
B. Selected Documents Relating to the Project
B-1 CNB's Plan for Extension Services to SSIs in 1982
B-2 CNB's Staff Training Program
B-3 CNB's Plan for Strengthening of Research Activities (especially
subsector studies)
B-4 CNB's Plan for Strengthening of Subproject Supervision Activities
B-5 Summary of Technical Discussions on items B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4
AEP Projects Department
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